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Abstract 
 
Artificial intelligence (AI) is increasingly expected to disrupt the ordinary functioning of society. 
From how we fight wars or govern society, to how we work and play, and from how we create to 
how we teach and learn, there is almost no field of human activity which is believed to be entirely 
immune from the impact of this emerging technology. This poses a multifaceted problem when it 
comes to designing and understanding regulatory responses to AI. This article aims to: (i) defend 
the need for a novel conceptual model for understanding the systemic legal disruption caused by 
new technologies such as AI; (ii) to situate this model in relation to preceding debates about the 
interaction of regulation with new technologies (particularly the µcyberlaw¶ aQd µURbRlaZ¶ debaWeV); 
and (iii) to set out a detailed model for understanding the legal disruption precipitated by AI, 
examining both pathways stemming from new affordances that can give rise to a regulatory 
µdiVUXSWiYe PRPeQW¶, aV Zell aV Whe Legal DeYelRSPeQW, DiVSlacePeQW RU DeVWUXcWiRQ that can 
ensue. The article proposes that this model of legal disruption can be broadly generalisable to 
understanding the legal effects and challenges of other emerging technologies. Thus, while our 
model of legal disruption is crafted in response to the specific regulatory challenges raised by AI, 
we believe that, with minor modifications, this model can be usefully deployed to understand the 
challenges raised by future emerging technologies, and to structure regulatory responses to those 
challenges.  
 
Introduction 
As a Zidel\ aSSlicable µgeQeUal SXUSRVe WechQRlRg\¶7 artificial intelligence (AI) has been 
recognized as having the potential to disrupt many social behaviours, practices and institutions. 
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Functionally speaking, AI is a portfolio of techniques that enable improvements in the accuracy, 
speed or scale of machine performance across complex or large (data) environments, with the aim 
of substituting for, or improving upon, human performance in diverse specific tasks such as 
decision-making, pattern-recognition and prediction. Accordingly, AI technology raises 
fundamental questions of power and control across society,8 and has been anticipated to challenge 
almost every sphere of human activity, as VRcieW\ WUaQViWiRQV iQWR a µdigiWal lifeZRUld¶.9 Uses²and 
concerns²range across diverse sectors, from legal decision-making and policing to health-care,10 
transport,11 and military uses,12 to name but a few.13 
Looking beyond the granular problems raised in each domain or sector, what does all this mean for 
the legal system? New technologies have a long history of challenging existing law.14 It should, 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Gans and Avi Goldfarb (eds), The Economics of Artificial Intelligence (2019) pt 1 
<https://www.preVV.XchicagR.edX/XcS/bRRkV/bRRk/chicagR/E/bR35780726.hWPl> acceVVed 12 FebUXaU\ 2019µAI aV a 
GPT¶. 
8 Hin-YaQ LiX, µThe PRZeU SWUXcWXUe Rf AUWificial IQWelligeQce¶ (2018) 10 LaZ, IQQRYaWiRQ aQd TechQRlRg\ 197. 
9 See generally Jamie Susskind, Future Politics: Living Together in a World Transformed by Tech (Oxford University 
Press 2018). 
10 The literature is vast; however, on the use of AI in the legal context, see also: HaUU\ SXUdeQ, µThe EWhicV Rf AUWificial 
IQWelligeQce iQ LaZ: BaVic QXeVWiRQV¶ iQ M DXbbeU aQd F PaVTXale (edV), The Oxford Handbook of AI Ethics (Oxford 
University Press 2019); GabUiele BXchhRlW], µAUWificial IQWelligeQce aQd Legal Tech: ChalleQgeV WR Whe RXle Rf LaZ¶ iQ 
Thomas Wischmeyer and Timo Rademacher (eds), Regulating Artificial Intelligence (Springer International Publishing 
2020) <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-32361-5_8> accessed 6 December 2019. On the use in policing, see for 
example AQQeWWe VeVWb\ aQd JRQaV VeVWb\, µMachiQe LeaUQiQg aQd Whe PRlice: AVkiQg Whe RighW QXeVWiRQV¶ [2019] 
Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice <https://academic.oup.com/policing/advance-
article/doi/10.1093/police/paz035/5518992> accessed 25 June 2019. On the use in healthcare, see: W Nicholson Price, 
µAUWificial IQWelligeQce iQ HealWh CaUe: ASSlicaWiRQV aQd Legal IVVXeV¶ (SRcial ScieQce ReVeaUch NeWZRUk 2017) SSRN 
Scholarly Paper ID 3078704 <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3078704> accessed 23 June 2018; Sarah Jabri, 
µAUWificial IQWelligeQce aQd HealWhcaUe: PURdXcWV aQd PURcedXUeV¶ iQ ThRPaV WiVchPe\eU aQd TiPR RadePacheU (edV), 
Regulating Artificial Intelligence (Springer International Publishing 2020) <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-32361-
5_14> accessed 6 December 2019. 
11 JeVVica S BURdVk\, µAXWRQRPRXV Vehicle RegXlaWiRQ: HRZ aQ UQceUWaiQ Legal LaQdVcaSe Ma\ HiW Whe BUakes on 
Self-DUiYiQg CaUV C\beUlaZ aQd VeQWXUe LaZ¶ (2016) 31 BeUkele\ TechQRlRg\ LaZ JRXUQal 851; JaPeV M AQdeUVRQ 
aQd RWheUV, µAXWRQRPRXV Vehicle TechQRlRg\: A GXide fRU PRlic\PakeUV¶ (RAND CRUSRUaWiRQ 2016) PURdXcW Page 
<https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR443-2.html> accessed 17 October 2017. 
12 Cf. KeQQeWh AQdeUVRQ aQd MaWWheZ C Wa[PaQ, µDebaWiQg AXWRQRPRXV WeaSRQ S\VWePV, TheiU EWhicV, aQd TheiU 
RegulaWiRQ XQdeU IQWeUQaWiRQal LaZ¶, The Oxford Handbook of Law, Regulation and Technology (2017) 
<http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199680832.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199680832-e-
33> accessed 3 January 2019; Dustin A Lewis, Gabriella Blum and Na] K MRdiU]adeh, µWaU-Algorithm 
AccRXQWabiliW\¶ (Harvard Law School Program on International Law and Armed Conflict 2016) Research Briefing 
<https://blogs.harvard.edu/pilac/files/2016/09/War-Algorithm-Accountability-Without-Appendices-August-2016.pdf> 
accessed 16 September 2016.  
13 For other general overviews of the issue space, see also Patrick Lin, Keith Abney and George A Bekey, Robot 
Ethics: The Ethical and Social Implications of Robotics (MIT Press 2011); Patrick Lin, Keith Abney and Ryan Jenkins 
(eds), Robot Ethics 2.0: From Autonomous Cars to Artificial Intelligence (Oxford University Press 2017); Ryan Calo, 
µAUWificial IQWelligeQce PRlic\: A PUiPeU aQd RRadPaS¶ (2017) 51 UC DaYiV LaZ ReYieZ 37; FRU a VXUYe\ WhaW fRcXVeV 
RQ iQWeUQaWiRQal gRYeUQaQce iVVXeV, Vee AllaQ DafRe, µAI GRYeUQaQce: A ReVeaUch AgeQda¶ (CeQWeU fRU Whe GRYeUQaQce 
of AI, Future of Humanity Institute 2018) <https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/govaiagenda/>; For a recent legal angle, see 
Wolfgang Hoffmann-RieP, µAUWificial IQWelligeQce aV a ChalleQge fRU LaZ aQd RegXlaWiRQ¶ iQ Thomas Wischmeyer and 
Timo Rademacher (eds), Regulating Artificial Intelligence (Springer International Publishing 2020) 
<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-32361-5_1> accessed 6 December 2019. 
14 See for instance L\Uia BeQQeWW MRVeV, µRecXUUiQg DilePPaV: The LaZ¶V Race WR KeeS US WiWh TechQRlRgical 
ChaQge¶ (2007) 21 UQiYeUViW\ Rf NeZ SRXWh WaleV FacXlW\ Rf LaZ ReVeaUch SeUieV 
<hWWS://ZZZ.aXVWlii.edX.aX/aX/jRXUQalV/UNSWLRS/2007/21.hWPl> acceVVed 3 JXl\ 2018; CRliQ B PickeU, µA VieZ fURP 
3 
 
consequently, come as no surprise that AI, given its broad usage, holds the potential to trigger large, 
and in some cases seismic, shifts across the legal and regulatory landscape.  
Given this, we believe that there is a need to present a new, integrated, contextual, and holistic 
model for understanding the disruptive effects of AI systems on law as such. Such a holistic model 
can be both illuminating for understanding the challenges posed by AI in specific domains, but it 
also offers more broadly transferable insights which can also be adapted and extended to understand 
other forms of technological legal disruption. Indeed, we think there is value to focusing specific 
aWWeQWiRQ RQ Whe SheQRPeQRQ Rf µlegal diVUXSWiRQ¶ SeU Ve, aV RSSRVed WR WechQRlRgical diVUXSWiRQ that 
happens to have legal consequences.15  
In the remainder of this article, we justify these claims, and provide a model for addressing legal 
disruption per se. We do this in four distinct phases. First, we justify the need for a general model of 
AI-based legal disruption. Second, we situate the need for that model within broader debates about 
technology and legal disruption, focusing in particular on the lessons we can learn from past debates 
abRXW µc\beUlaZ¶ aQd µURbRlaZ¶. Third, we outline and describe our proposed model in detail. And 
fourth, we discuss the advantages and limitations of this model. We conclude by reflecting on the 
future development of the model. 
 
1. The CaVe fRU a GeQeUal MRdel Rf µLegal DiVUXSWiRQ¶ 
 
We VWaUW b\ aQVZeUiQg Whe µZh\¶ TXeVWiRQ: Wh\ dR we need to develop a generalised model of legal 
disruption? One obvious reason is that having a model helps us to chart, manage and mitigate the 
disruptive impacts of AI. As outlined in the introduction, AI is expected to have widespread effects 
on societal practices and values. We may be paralysed in our capacity to address these impacts if we 
lack a model that allows us to make reasoned judgments about the probability and likely impact of 
such disruptive possibilities.  
One way in which this paralysis could PaQifeVW iWVelf iV iQ a UegXlaWRU\ gaPe Rf µZhack-a-PRle¶, 
whereby both scholarship and regulatory responses are tailored reactively to each challenge raised 
by AI. This would amount to treating the symptoms of legal disruption instead of addressing the 
cause. It would overlook the opportunity to develop an overarching regulatory regime capable of 
guiding law and policy in the face of AI challenges more generally.16 
Consider a concrete example: In recent years, one of the more high-profile substantive debates 
concerning the legal impact of AI has focused on so-called Autonomous Weapons Systems 
                                                                                                                                                                  
40,000 Feet: InternatiRQal LaZ aQd Whe IQYiVible HaQd Rf TechQRlRg\¶ (2001) 23 CaUdR]R LaZ ReYieZ 151; DaYid D 
FUiedPaQ, µDReV TechQRlRg\ ReTXiUe NeZ LaZ?¶ (2001) 71 PXblic PRlic\ 16.  
15 See also MaUgRW E KaPiQVki, µAXWhRUVhiS, DiVUXSWed: AI AXWhRUV iQ CRS\UighW aQd FiUVW APeQdPeQW LaZ¶ (2017) 
51 UC Davis Law Review 589.  
16 Though see MaWWheZ U ScheUeU, µRegXlaWiQg AUWificial IQWelligeQce S\VWePV: RiVkV, ChalleQgeV, CRPSeWeQcieV, aQd 
SWUaWegieV¶ [2016] HaUYaUd JRXUQal Rf LaZ & TechQRlRg\ 
<http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/articles/pdf/v29/29HarvJLTech353.pdf> accessed 5 March 2018; Michael Guihot, Anne F 
MaWWheZ aQd NicRlaV SX]RU, µNXdgiQg RRbRWV: IQQRYaWiYe SRlXWiRQV WR RegXlaWe AUWificial IQWelligeQce¶ [2017] 
Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3017004> accessed 2 July 
2018. 
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(AWS).17 But many of the basic legal issues surrounding AWS, such as establishing liability for 
harm, reckoning with and preventing unanticipated accident cascades,18 considering µVWUXcWXUal¶ 
effecWV Rf Whe WechQRlRg\¶V deSlR\PeQW,19 and reckoning with the blurring of actor and object, are 
considerations that are not narrowly applicable to international humanitarian law (IHL), but apply to 
many manifestations of AI-based technologies. This has already become apparent with the 
emergence of the debate about the legal repercussions of autonomous vehicles.20 Roger 
Brownsword has argued that diverse uses of AI, such as autonomous road traffic, autonomous 
weapons, and profiling, prediction and prevention, rather than being distinct and isolated issue 
areas, can be productively examined in common, through the lens of how these applications violate 
or challenge human dignity.21 
In the siloed view, however, regulatory responses are compartmentalised by, and therefore focus 
attention on certain activity areas, while overlooking or rendering peripheral other areas of the 
potential problem (and solution) space.  
Consider another example: the case of so-called µDeeSFakeV¶. SiQce ePeUgiQg in 2017, the 
Generative Adversarial Networks (GAN)-based technique for generating fake but nearly 
indistinguishable-from-real content has sparked the imagination (and panic) of the public. Spurred 
                                                 
17 Armin Krishnan, Killer Robots: Legality and Ethicality of Autonomous Weapons (1 edition, Routledge 2009); PW 
Singer, Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century (Penguin Press 2009). Whether the 
prominence of this issue is because military expenditure in research fuelled rapid technological development and public 
µaUPV UaceV¶, becaXVe leWhaliW\ b\ algRUiWhP aQd PachiQe caXghW ciYil VRcieW\ aWWeQWiRQ fRU beiQg SaUWicXlaUl\ egUegiRXV, 
or because the legal and regulatory issues surrounding military robotics have proven especially visceral and intuitive to 
grasp, does not matter for our purposes. HRZeYeU, fRU VRPe e[aPiQaWiRQ iQWR Whe UeceQW µaUPV UaceV¶ RQ AWS, Vee 
JXVWiQ HaQeU aQd DeQiVe GaUcia, µThe AUWificial IQWelligeQce AUPV Race: TUeQdV aQd WRUld LeadeUV iQ AXWRQRPRXV 
WeaSRQV DeYelRSPeQW¶ (2019) 10 GlRbal PRlic\ 331; ThRXgh fRU a cUiWical aQgle RQ Whe µaUPV Uace¶ aQgle, Vee Heather 
M RRff, µThe FUaPe PURbleP: The AI ³AUPV Race´ IVQ¶W OQe¶ (2019) 0 BXlleWiQ Rf Whe AWRPic ScieQWiVWV 1. On the 
recent history and developments of civil society movements to ban these technologies, see: Charli Carpenter, µLost¶ 
Causes, Agenda Vetting in Global Issue Networks and the Shaping of Human Security (Cornell University Press 2014) 
<hWWS://ZZZ.degUX\WeU.cRP/YieZbRRkWRc/SURdXcW/487489> acceVVed 1 ASUil 2019; ùeUif OQXU Bahoecik, µCiYil SRcieW\ 
ReVSRQdV WR Whe AWS: GURZiQg AcWiYiVW NeWZRUkV aQd ShifWiQg FUaPeV¶ (2019) 0 GlRbal PRlic\ 
<https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1758-5899.12671> accessed 17 June 2019. 
18 For research into this underexplored angle, see PaXl SchaUUe, µAXWRQRPRXV WeaSRQV aQd OSeUaWiRQal RiVk¶ (CeQWeU 
for a New American Security 2016) <https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNAS_Autonomous-
weapons-operational-UiVk.Sdf>; MaWWhijV M MaaV, µRegXlaWiQg fRU ³NRUPal AI AccideQWV´²Operational Lessons for the 
ReVSRQVible GRYeUQaQce Rf AI DeSlR\PeQW¶, Proceedings of the 2018 AAAI / ACM Conference on Artificial 
Intelligence, Ethics and Society (Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence 2018) <http://www.aies-
conference.com/wp-cRQWeQW/SaSeUV/PaiQ/AIES_2018_SaSeU_118.Sdf>; SWeShaQie CaUYiQ, µNRUPal AXWRQRPRXV 
Accidents: What Happens When Killer RRbRWV Fail?¶ (SRcial ScieQce ReVeaUch NeWZRUk 2017) SSRN SchRlaUl\ PaSeU 
ID 3161446 <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3161446> accessed 17 December 2019. 
19 cf. Hin-YaQ LiX, µThUee T\SeV Rf SWUXcWXUal DiVcUiPiQaWiRQ IQWURdXced b\ AXWRQRPRXV VehicleV¶ (2018) 51 UC 
Davis Law Review 32. See also the discussion of the structural effects of AI technology, and the similarities of such 
risks across different usage domains--whether military or in self-driving cars--in Remco Zwetsloot and Allan Dafoe, 
µThiQkiQg AbRXW RiVkV FURP AI: AccideQWV, MiVXVe aQd SWUXcWXUe¶ (Lawfare, 11 February 2019) 
<https://www.lawfareblog.com/thinking-about-risks-ai-accidents-misuse-and-structure> accessed 12 February 2019. 
20 Hin-YaQ LiX, µIUUeVSRQVibiliWieV, IQeTXaliWieV aQd IQjXVWice fRU AXWRQRPRXV VehicleV¶ (2017) 19 EWhicV aQd 
Information Technology 193. 
21 RRgeU BURZQVZRUd, µFURP EUeZhRQ WR AlShaGR: FRU Whe Sake Rf HXPaQ DigQiW\, ShRXld We DeVWUR\ Whe 
MachiQeV?¶ (2017) 9 LaZ, IQQRYaWiRQ aQd TechQRlRg\ 117. 
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on by high-profile use cases or demonstrations involving fake videos of prominent politicians,22 
however, much public debate, academic work and even the incipient regulatory action has framed 
DeepFakes narrowly in the context of two specific problem domains: a personal threat in the form 
of forged pornography, or a political threat to democracy.23 In consequence, the first legislative 
efforts to control this technology ± a Virginian24 ban on the use of DeepFakes for nonconsensual 
pornography in summer 2019, and Californian25 and Chinese26 bans in the autumn ± focused on 
these specific challenges.  
While certainly an important step, however, such laws have been criticized as being narrowly 
focused and full of loopholes and shortcomings.27 These shortcomings may derive from problems 
that are general rather than specific, and have more to do with the underlying reactive domain-
focused approach which leads to a range of analytical and practical regulatory shortcomings. First, 
iW Pa\ RYeUVWaWe Whe QRYelW\ RU µadded YalXe¶ Rf DeeSFake WechQRlRg\, UelaWiYe WR eVWabliVhed 
techniques and approaches (so-called µcheaS fakeV¶) fRU iQfRUPaWiRQ ZaUfaUe.28 Second, the 
emphasis on the use of DeepFakes for the production of fake visual media, may underestimate the 
degree to which political information warfare might find greater use for less-visceral cases, such as 
the generation of fake text.29 ThiUdl\, Whe ePShaViV RQ DeeSFakeV aV a SaUWicXlaU µSURbleP¶ 
requiring specific solutions ± such as the Californian and Chinese bans ± does not focus sufficient 
attention on underlying or foundational problems in the way in which digital technology 
                                                 
22 See for instance BuzzFeedVideo, You Won¶t Believe What Obama Sa\s In This Video! (2018) 
<hWWSV://ZZZ.\RXWXbe.cRP/ZaWch?Y=cQ54GDP1eL0> acceVVed 18 FebUXaU\ 2019; BBC, µAUe YRX FRRled b\ ThiV 
Johnson-CRUb\Q VideR?¶ (BBC News, 12 November 2019) <https://www.bbc.com/news/av/technology-50381728/the-
fake-video-where-johnson-and-corbyn-endorse-each-RWheU> acceVVed 9 DecePbeU 2019; BRb SchaffeU, µPUeVideQW 
Nixon Never Actually Gave This Apollo 11 Disaster Speech. MIT Brought It To Life To Illustrate Power Of 
DeepfakeV¶ (wbur, 22 November 2019) <https://www.wbur.org/news/2019/11/22/mit-nixon-deep-fake> accessed 9 
December 2019. For one case in which a political DeepFake video went viral, see Hans von der Burchard, µBelgiaQ 
SRcialiVW PaUW\ CiUcXlaWeV ³DeeS Fake´ DRQald TUXPS VideR¶ (Politico, 21 May 2018) 
<https://www.politico.eu/article/spa-donald-trump-belgium-paris-climate-agreement-belgian-socialist-party-circulates-
deep-fake-trump-video/> accessed 18 February 2019. 
23 RRbeUW CheVQe\ aQd DaQielle KeaWV CiWURQ, µDeeS Fakes: A Looming Challenge for Privacy, Democracy, and 
NaWiRQal SecXUiW\¶ (2019) 107 CalifRUQia LaZ ReYieZ <hWWSV://SaSeUV.VVUQ.cRP/abVWUacW=3213954> acceVVed 17 
November 2018. 
24 Adi RRbeUWVRQ, µViUgiQia¶V ³ReYeQge PRUQ´ LaZV NRZ Officiall\ CRYeU DeeSfakeV¶ (The Verge, 1 July 2019) 
<https://www.theverge.com/2019/7/1/20677800/virginia-revenge-porn-deepfakes-nonconsensual-photos-videos-ban-
goes-into-effect> accessed 17 December 2019. 
25 µAB-730 ElecWiRQV: DeceSWiYe AXdiR RU ViVXal Media.¶ (4 OcWRbeU 2019) 
<https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201920200AB730> accessed 9 December 2019. 
26 YiQg]hi YaQg aQd BUeQda GRh, µChiQa SeekV WR RRRW RXW Fake News and Deepfakes with New Online Content 
RXleV¶ Reuters (29 November 2019) <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-technology-idUSKBN1Y30VU> 
accessed 9 December 2019. 
27 BUaQdie M NRQQecke, µAQWi-DeeSfake LaZ iQ CalifRUQia IV FaU TRR Feeble¶ [2019] Wired 
<https://www.wired.com/story/opinion-californias-anti-deepfake-law-is-far-too-feeble/> accessed 17 December 2019. 
28 BUiWW PaUiV aQd JRaQ DRQRYaQ, µDeeSFakeV aQd CheaS FakeV: The MaQiSXlaWiRQ Rf AXdiR & ViVXal EYideQce¶ (DaWa 
& Society 2019) <https://datasociety.net/output/deepfakes-and-cheap-fakes/>. 
29 See also the debate around the social impacts and risks of the OpenAI GPT-2 natural language generation model. 
IUeQe SRlaiPaQ aQd RWheUV, µReleaVe SWUaWegieV aQd Whe SRcial IPSacWV Rf LaQgXage MRdelV¶ [2019] aUXiY:1908.09203 
[cs] <http://arxiv.org/abs/1908.09203> accessed 18 November 2019. Although see Aviv Ovadya and Jess Whittlestone, 
µRedXciQg MaliciRXV UVe Rf S\QWheWic Media ReVeaUch: CRQVideUaWiRQV aQd PRWeQWial ReleaVe PUacWiceV fRU MachiQe 
LeaUQiQg¶ [2019] aUXiY:1907.11274 [cV] <hWWS://aU[iY.RUg/abV/1907.11274> acceVVed 9 SeSWePbeU 2019. 
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iQcUeaViQgl\ eQableV gUaQXlaU µSeUceSWiRQ-cRQWURl¶.30 In this way, the narrow focus on (visual) 
µDeeSFakeV¶ SUiPeV Whe debaWe WR Veek iQcUePeQWal aQd diVVRciaWed UeVSRQVeV WR an array of 
symptomatic issues. In many cases, responses resort too early or easily to narrow, technical 
solutions such as automatic ways of detecting DeepFake videos31 ± temporary technical solutions 
such as automated detection which have at any rate proven easily defeated or bypassed,32 and which 
Pa\ iQdeed haYe aQ iQheUeQWl\ liPiWed µhalf-life¶ Rf YiabiliW\ iQ Whe face Rf aV\PSWRWicall\ 
improving fidelity.33 Such narrow framings which emphasize near-term (technological) solutions 
may inadvertently but functionally stack the deck against regulation, locking policy responses into 
arms races which they are not well placed to win.  
Similar dynamics play out not just in examples such as DeepFakes, autonomous vehicles, or 
autonomous weapons systems, but across many other domain areas where AI (and digital 
technology more broadly) has been intersecting with established legal domains, disciplines, or 
processes. Exploring the nexus between AI, law, and regulation from pre-established points of 
departure or the most visceral discrete problem domains is a rather haphazard way to proceed. The 
problem is five-fold.  
First, by following a piecemeal regulatory approach, attention and resources are not necessarily 
allocated in accordance with the nature or severity of the challenge that an emerging technology 
poses to the legal and regulatory systems, but are instead prioritized on the basis of a technology¶V 
public profile, hype, and factors that can be easily driven by in-the-lab proofs of concept or by 
visceral incidents of misuse. As the example of the current use of DeepFakes suggests, these are 
SRRU gXideV WR Whe WechQRlRg\¶V acWXal VRcieWal iPSacWV.34 That law and regulation follow where 
technological development leads, reduces regulatory initiatives very much to mere responses, 
constrained to the paths that are laid down. This responsivity leaves law and regulation 
disorganised, as its gaze is focused on the technological capability or artefact, resulting in an 
incoherent and scattershot approach.35 Furthermore, technological development and deployment are 
left to proceed in a relatively unguided manner, that relegates regulatory or democratic concerns to 
an afterthought. If the design or architecture of a system influences or constrains the range of 
possible behaviours of regulatees,36 this responsive orientation limits the potential efficacy of 
                                                 
30 Susskind (n 9) 142±152. 
31 To give but one example, see IUeQe APeUiQi aQd RWheUV, µDeeSfake VideR DeWecWiRQ WhURXgh OSWical FlRZ BaVed 
CNN¶ 3. 
32 See for instance DaYide CR]]RliQR aQd RWheUV, µSSRC: SSRRfiQg CaPeUa FiQgeUSUiQWV¶ [2019] aUXiY:1911.12069 [cV, 
eess] <http://arxiv.org/abs/1911.12069> accessed 9 December 2019. 
33 See Alex Engler, µFighWiQg DeeSfakeV WheQ DeWecWiRQ FailV¶ (Brookings, 14 November 2019) 
<https://www.brookings.edu/research/fighting-deepfakes-when-detection-fails/> accessed 11 December 2019. For 
example, recent breakthroughs have further addressed previous flaws and shortcomings in GAN image quality; see Tero 
KaUUaV aQd RWheUV, µAQal\]iQg aQd IPSURYiQg Whe IPage QXaliW\ Rf SW\leGAN¶ [2019] arXiv:1912.04958 [cs, eess, stat] 
<http://arxiv.org/abs/1912.04958> accessed 17 December 2019. 
34 PeUhaSV echRiQg Whe legal Pa[iP WhaW µhaUd caVeV Pake bad laZV¶. 
35 This suggests such an approach does not work even from a legal coherentist perspective. For discussion of which, see 
the section on Stage 2 (a) Legal Development (v). 
36 Cf. Donella H Meadows, Thinking in Systems: A Primer (Diana Wright ed, Chelsea Green Publishing 2008). 
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regulation, because its range of possible influence is curtailed as a result of the specific policy 
focus.37 
Second, this domain-specific focus treats the symptoms of the problem, rather than the cause. It 
fragments attention that could otherwise be directed at addressing the core source of the problem. 
Because they constitute a set of µgeQeUal SXUSRVe WechQRlRgieV¶ WhaW aUe Ueadil\ iQcRUSRUaWed iQWR 
almost any existing activity,38 the breadth of regulatory issues raised by AI span the spectrum of 
human activities. Likewise, addressing the legal challenges raised by autonomous weapons systems, 
or autonomous vehicles, to use the examples above, contextualises those challenges within the 
confines of IHL and the highway code respectively. In other words, the questions raised by robotics 
and AI in these contexts are not necessarily, or even predominantly, questions triggered by the 
emerging technologies. Rather, such debates, implicitly or explicitly, seek to maintain µlegal 
cRheUeQce¶,39 and to ensure the non-turbulent continuation of the pre-existing regulatory equilibria 
in these areas, thereby imposing a unidirectional flow of lessons towards addressing the precise 
practical problem but not considering the broader nature of the challenges posed. Thus, focusing 
attention on the introduction of robotics and AI into armed conflict and transportation and political 
misinformation may teach us lessons in these activity areas, but they rarely shed significant light 
upon the structural and systemic challenges raised from this tight cluster of emerging technologies.  
Third, the lack of extant framework or typology to organise the legal and regulatory approaches to 
robotics and AI, means that law can, at best, seek to discern patterns in regulatory responses 
retrospectively. The lack of a framework makes it difficult to distinguish clusters of issues in 
advance, or to identify the common characteristics that underlie them. For instance, a cross-cutting 
analysis of DeepFakes within such a broader framework, would anticipate more commonalities with 
extant work on, for example, computational propaganda generally,40 treating these issues together 
from the start. A different way of putting this is that it is unclear where the source of legal 
controversy lies. Does the regulatory challenge emanate from the inherent characteristics or 
capabilities of the technology itself? Does the legal confusion arise from the deployment of that 
technology into society? Might the shortcomings of the law be due to different equilibria being 
struck as technological and societal change balance out? Or might the problems lie elsewhere 
entirely? This jumble of issues makes it difficult to establish a hierarchy that separates challenges 
according to the breadth of the interface, the severity of the impact, and the duration of the resulting 
legal and societal turbulence. Gauging whether a particular legal problem poses superficial or 
structural questions thus becomes obscured or overlooked. But such a determination is critical, 
because it determines whether legal accommodation will be capable of addressing the problems 
posed (if these are relatively superficial, or at least not paradigm changing), or conversely if it will 
                                                 
37 LaZUeQce LeVVig, µThe NeZ ChicagR SchRRl¶ (1998) 27 The JRXUQal Rf Legal SWXdieV 661; LaZUeQce LeVVig, µThe 
LaZ Rf Whe HRUVe: WhaW C\beUlaZ MighW Teach¶ (1999) 113 Harvard Law Review 501. 
38 Trajtenberg (n 7); Agrawal, Gans and Goldfarb (n 7). 
39 OQ Whe diffeUeQceV beWZeeQ µcRheUeQW¶, µUegXlaWRU\-iQVWUXPeQWaliVW¶, aQd µWechQRcUaWic¶ UegXlaWRU\ aWWiWXdeV, Vee alVR 
RRgeU BURZQVZRUd, µLaZ DiVUXSWed, LaZ Re-Imagined, Law Re-IQYeQWed¶ [2019] TechQRlRg\ aQd RegXlaWiRQ 10; AQd 
generally Roger Brownsword, Law, Technology and Society: Re-Imagining the Regulatory Environment (1 edition, 
Routledge 2019). 
40 See for instance Gillian Bolsover and PhiliS HRZaUd, µCRPSXWaWiRQal PURSagaQda aQd PRliWical Big DaWa: MRYiQg 
TRZaUd a MRUe CUiWical ReVeaUch AgeQda¶ (2017) 5 Big DaWa 273; SaP WRRlle\ aQd Phil HRZaUd, µCRPSXWaWiRQal 
PURSagaQda WRUldZide¶ (O[fRUd IQWeUQeW IQVWiWXWe 2017) <hWWS://cRPSURS.Rii.R[.ac.uk/2017/06/19/computational-
propaganda-worldwide-executive-summary/> accessed 25 June 2017. 
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contribute towards entrenching the problem (if these are structural and systemic) because the law by 
itself would be incapable of addressing the entire problem.  
Fourth, this domain-specific focus has a distorting effect upon the debate, both by prioritising 
regulatory activity along sectoral lines, and by emphasising immediate and near-term practical 
problems. An example of this is the liability questions arising from AI possessing discretional 
autonomy which breaks the chain of causation traditionally relied upon to establish fault and 
compensation.41 Such questions loom large over the legal landscape where AI and the law are 
deePed WR cRllide. IQdiUecW RU ³VecRQd-RUdeU´ UegXlaWRU\ challeQges are thus externalised or 
UeVigQed WR ViPSle µeWhical cRQVideUaWiRQV¶, eYeQ WhRXgh WheVe challeQgeV hRld Whe SRWeQWial WR 
fundamentally alter the regulatory landscape. Again, the threat of DeepFakes (and computational 
propaganda generally) might lie less in the possibility that these techniques could increase in quality 
to such a level that they could get any target public to trust certain political messages (in which case 
responses aimed at detecting imperfections would help). The deeper threat may be less about 
manufacturing misplaced trust, but rather about fracturing public knowledge by getting target 
publics to disWUXVW all digiWal Pedia, aV Zell aV affRUdiQg ceUWaiQ acWRUV Whe µliaUV diYideQd¶ (Whe 
ability to deflect accusations of recorded improper conduct by claiming the material has been 
faked).42 More broadly, the argument has been made that democracies are asymmetrically and 
intrinsically more vulnerable to certain misinformation attacks than autocracies.43 If this is true, the 
focus of regulatory responses should lie at this global level ± at the broad range of vectors (whether 
high- or low-Wech) WhaW cRQWUibXWe WR µWUXWh deca\¶44 ± rather than on merely patching local 
vulnerabilities to specific techniques of information warfare. It should look less at the potential 
impacts of DeepFakes on specific target groups (politicians for example), but rather on tacit 
fundamentalV VXch aV Whe µeSiVWePic backVWRS¶ Rf VRcieW\.45 Or, to return to an earlier example, 
traditional liability doctrines structure incentives and disincentives towards certain societal ends. Is 
it possible that these ends might be achieved more surely and securely through other means (for 
example through different regulatory modalities),46 or through µWechQRlRgical PaQagePeQW¶ Rf 
behaviour?47  
Fifth, and finally, focusing on particular interfaces between the technology and the law presumes 
stasis in reality, in technological processes, in legal processes, and in societal processes. This is 
implied in the focus on deriving a straightforward solution once a legal problem has been identified. 
The reality is very different. Technologies change and develop over time, often rapidly. DeepFakes 
                                                 
41 Hin-YaQ LiX, µRefiQiQg ReVSRQVibiliW\: DiffeUeQWiaWiQg TZR T\SeV Rf ReVSRQVibiliW\ IVVXeV RaiVed b\ AXWRQRPRXV 
Weapons S\VWePV¶ iQ Nehal BhXWa aQd RWheUV (edV), Autonomous Weapons Systems: Law, Ethics, Policy (2016). 
42 Engler (n 33). 
43 cf. HeQU\ FaUUell aQd BUXce SchQeieU, µCRPPRQ-KQRZledge AWWackV RQ DePRcUac\¶ (BeUkPaQ KleiQ CeQWeU 2018) 
Research Publication 2018±7 <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3273111> accessed 13 January 2019. 
44 JeQQifeU KaYaQagh aQd Michael D Rich, µTUXWh Deca\: A ThUeaW WR PRlic\PakiQg aQd DePRcUac\¶ (RAND 2018) 
RB-10002-RC <https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB10002.html>. 
45 As defined by Regina Rini, the epistemic backVWRS UeflecWV WhaW µRXU UeaVRQable WUXVW iQ Whe WeVWiPRQ\ Rf RWheUV 
depends, to a surprising extent, on the regulative effects of the ever-present possibility of recordings of the events they 
WeVWif\ abRXW.¶ RegiQa RiQi, µDeeSfakeV aQd Whe ESiVWePic BackVWRS¶ (2019) 1 
<https://philpapers.org/archive/RINDAT.pdf>. 
46 LeVVig, µThe NeZ ChicagR SchRRl¶ (Q 37); LeVVig, µThe LaZ Rf Whe HRUVe¶ (Q 37). 
47 RRgeU BURZQVZRUd, µIQ Whe YeaU 2061: FURP LaZ WR TechQRlRgical MaQagePeQW¶ (2015) 7 LaZ, IQQRYaWiRQ aQd 
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have gone from µXQkQRZQ¶ WR µPiQRU PiVXVe¶ WR µSURVSecWiYe cUiPiQal SheQRPeQRQ¶ iQ XQdeU fRXU 
or five years. In that time, there have been rapid shifts in use cases, as well as important changes in 
fidelity that have rapidly rendered obsolete assumptions that were once valid. After the publication 
of early technological proposals for automated DeepFake detection, which relied on DeepFakes (at 
the time) inability to render teeth or to have subjects blink,48 it took only a few months for new 
techniques to emerge which corrected these imperfections.49 As such, the discrete solve-it-once-
and-for-all approach fails to track the continuous co-evolution of technological and societal 
changes, and cripples any resulting legal or regulatory responses. The risk is that initial, domain-
focused legal responses may treat a problem as solved as soon as its latest symptom has been 
addressed. This then closes the door to sustained investigation or more anticipatory regulation that 
can reckon with longer-term, more cross-sectoral threats. AV L\Uia BeQQeWW MRVeV RbVeUYeV, µ[W]he 
special relationship between legal problems and technological change can be seen by examining the 
timing Rf legal SURblePV aUiViQg fURP a cRPbiQaWiRQ Rf WechQRlRgical aQd behaYiRXUal chaQgeV¶.50 
Her argument suggests that the legal problems associated with the introduction of new technologies 
precede widespread social acceptance and adoption of the technology in question, and the social 
impact that this implies. If nothing else, however, the staggered nature of the legal challenges 
introduced by new technologies suggests the presence of several stages where new technologies 
precipitate legal problems, and that each new technology potentially presents a cascade of legal 
questions.51  
In short, the current domain-specific approach is undermined by being technologically-focused, 
fragmented in its approach, and isolated in its responses and impact. A general model of the legal 
disruption induced by AI would provide an organising framework capable of differentiating the 
significance of the legal questions identified in each domain, and would have the flexibility and 
dynamism to respond to the shifting legal challenges that this new technology triggers. To put this 
another way, one reason for favouring a general model is that greater regulatory consistency could 
be achieved. Our responses would cut across fields of activity, minimising the variation amongst 
regulatory responses in different sectors. Rather than having one regulatory regime arise for the use 
of autonomous vehicles, and another to govern the use of autonomous weapons systems and another 
for the use of algorithmic trading bots, a more consistent and coherent approach that addresses the 
core problems posed by the technology could be developed.52  
                                                 
48 JonaWhaQ HXi, µHRZ DeeS LeaUQiQg FakeV VideRV (DeeSfake) aQd HRZ WR DeWecW IW?¶ (Medium, 8 October 2019) 
<https://medium.com/@jonathan_hui/how-deep-learning-fakes-videos-deepfakes-and-how-to-detect-it-c0b50fbf7cb9> 
accessed 11 December 2019; Yuezun Li, Ming-ChiQg ChaQg aQd SiZei L\X, µIQ IcWX OcXli: E[SRViQg AI CUeaWed Fake 
Videos by DetectiQg E\e BliQkiQg¶, 2018 IEEE International Workshop on Information Forensics and Security (WIFS) 
(IEEE 2018) <https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8630787/> accessed 11 December 2019. 
49 See Engler (n 33). 
50 L\Uia BeQQeWW MRVeV, µWh\ HaYe a TheRU\ Rf LaZ aQd TechQRlRgical ChaQge?¶ (2007) 8 MiQQeVRWa JRXUQal Rf LaZ, 
Science & Technology 589, 599 (Emphasis added). 
51 At minimum, these would include: the new possibilities unlocked at the proof-of-concept stage; the possible and 
actual legal issues raised by the first wave of limited deployment; the more widespread considerations attendant with 
mass adoption; and the legal concerns triggered by shifts in society engendered by that technology.  
52 The question over whether legal µcRheUeQce¶ will remain a primary desideratum for regulators, or whether it may 
come to be supplemented or even replaced by measures of instrumental effectiveness, is taken up by much of the work 
of Roger Brownsword. See RRgeU BURZQVZRUd, µLaZ aQd TechQRlRg\: TZR MRdeV Rf DiVUXSWiRQ, ThUee Legal MiQd-
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Along with these five reasons for developing a general holistic model to respond to the legal 
disruption caused by a new technology, there is a sixth AI-specific reason for favouring a general 
model. Some people may argue that the legal challenges posed by AI are to some extent 
unprecedented: artificial applications or non-human entities which some think should be recognised 
as legal persons by virtue of their intelligence, capacities or appearance.53 Thus, a large cluster of 
legal questions posed by AI arises from its apparent liminal status between agents and objects 
which does not fit easily into the duality enforced by ordinary legal processes. This novelty suggests 
that AI can serve as a portal through which the legal system can be examined from different 
perspectives. In other words, while existing law holds the potential to be complete in relation to 
human beings and human activities, it is currently incapable of being complete with respect 
artificial agents and objects, which either carve out new areas that are devoid of regulation, or 
which reveal gaps or shortcomings in the existing legal order. This suggests that engaging with the 
general legal challenges raised by AI can serve to teach us new lessons about the law, and help 
refine legal principles and processes which have hitherto not required precise fine tuning.54 
The above, of course, assumes that there is something genuinely disruptive about AI. Perhaps this is 
not true? Some will argue that the hype about the disruptive impact of a new technology is simply 
just that, and that existing legal doctrine and regulatory processes are largely or entirely able to 
accommodate or adapt to the new situation.55 The iterative nature of the law, for example, has 
meant that the legal system can be surprisingly resilient to moderate exogenous shocks through 
gradual adaptation and incremental change.56 What staunch adherence to the law often overlooks is 
not necessarily what is new about a technology or what gaps or inadequacies it might reveal, but 
how existing legal equilibria might be perturbed by the introduction of new technologies in an 
indirect, tangential and second-order fashion.57AV VXch, Zhile AI PighW iQdeed µSURYe [WR be] 
³e[ceSWiRQal´ iQ Whe VeQVe of occasioning systematic changes to law, institutions, and the legal 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Sets, and the Big Picture of Regulatory ResponsibiliWieV¶ (2018) 14 IQdiaQ JRXUQal Rf LaZ aQd TechQRlRg\ 1; 
BURZQVZRUd, µLaZ DiVUXSWed, LaZ Re-Imagined, Law Re-IQYeQWed¶ (Q 39).  
53 We VhRXld QRWe heUe WhaW RWheU ZRUk e[SliciWl\ dRZQSla\V Whe VigQificaQce Rf µiQWelligeQce¶ aV a defiQiQg RU UeleYaQW 
characteristic of the challenges posed by AI; see LiX, µThe PRZeU SWUXcWXUe Rf AUWificial IQWelligeQce¶ (Q 8); HiQ-Yan 
LiX, µFURP Whe AXWRQRP\ FUaPeZRUk WRZaUdV NeWZRUkV aQd S\VWePV ASSURacheV fRU ³AXWRQRPRXV´ WeaSRQV 
S\VWePV¶ (2019) 10 JRXUQal Rf IQWeUQaWiRQal HXPaQiWaUiaQ Legal SWXdieV 89. The point here is that these characteristics 
of AI still dominate the definitions that are proposed, and thus heavily influence the types of legal challenges that are 
identified as a result.  
54 Questions of responsibility are perhaps the best example of this. Before the advent of robotics and AI, the responsible 
entity has been either individual or collectives of human beings and the main questions revolved around culpability and 
punishment. Yet, because of the difficulties of attributing responsibility to artificial entities or applications, 
responsibility gaps have emerged, thereby introducing substantial uncertainty in an area which before did not raise any 
significant questions. See the example of the responsibility problems raised by autonomous weapons systems in Robert 
SSaUURZ, µKilleU RRbRWV¶ (2007) 24 JRXUQal Rf ASSlied PhilRVRSh\ 62; MaUcXV SchXl]ke, µAXWRQRPRXV WeaSRQV aQd 
DiVWUibXWed ReVSRQVibiliW\¶ (2013) 26 PhilRVRSh\ & TechQRlRg\ 203; LiX, µRefiQiQg ReVSRQVibiliW\: DiffeUeQWiaWiQg 
TZR T\SeV Rf ReVSRQVibiliW\ IVVXeV RaiVed b\ AXWRQRPRXV WeaSRQV S\VWePV¶ (Q 41). 
55 See for example MaUWiQa KXQ] aQd SeiQ Ï heigeaUWaigh, µAUWificial IQWelligeQce aQd RRbRWi]aWiRQ¶ iQ RRbiQ GeiVV 
and Nils Melzer (eds), Oxford Handbook on the International Law of Global Security (Oxford University Press 2020) 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3310421> accessed 30 January 2019.; ThRPaV BXUUi, µIQWeUQaWiRQal LaZ aQd 
Artificial IQWelligeQce¶ (2017) 60 GeUPaQ YeaUbRRk Rf IQWeUQaWiRQal LaZ 91.  
56 JB RXhl, µLaZ¶V CRPSle[iW\: A PUiPeU¶ (2007) 24 GeRUgia SWaWe UQiYeUViW\ LaZ ReYieZ 885. 
57 Jack M BalkiQ, µThe PaWh Rf RRbRWicV LaZ¶ (2015) 6 CalifRUnia Law Review Circuit 17. 
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acadeP\¶,58 in the end, such effects might occur in more diffuse and subtle ways. Thus, even if AI 
does not necessarily embody new challenges that sets it apart in a direct and explicit manner, it may 
be that vigilance is necessary because of unanticipated effects.59 This gets overlooked if the legal 
focus is predominantly tuned into resolving problems posed by AI in discrete domains, which in 
turn renders the legal order especially vulnerable to the turbulence that AI might trigger.  
In summary, a general model of AI-induced legal disruption is justified because it (a) ensures a 
more consistent, dynamic and joined-up approach to the regulatory challenges posed by AI; (b) 
allows us to appreciate some of the unique and potentially unprecedented effects that AI may have 
on legal systems that might otherwise be overlooked, and (c) more generally allows for greater 
vigilance with respect to the unanticipated, second-order effects that might arise from the 
widespread use of AI. The argument can be bolstered by considering some of the recent debates 
about the impact of technology on law in a little more detail. 
 
2. Towards a General Model: Lessons from the Cyberlaw and Robolaw Debates 
 
If a general model is required, what form might it take and what pitfalls should be avoided when 
trying to develop it? We can help to answer this question by considering past debates about the 
legal disruption caused by new technologies.  
Consider, in the first place, the old debate in cyberlaw between Frank Easterbrook and Lawrence 
Lessig.60 This debate UeYRlYed aURXQd Whe TXeVWiRQ Rf ZheWheU a QeZ diVciSliQe Rf µc\beUlaZ¶ ZRXld 
be necessary to study the impact of information communication technologies on the legal system. 
EaVWeUbURRk faPRXVl\ deSlR\ed Whe aQalRg\ Rf µThe LaZ Rf Whe HRUVe¶, claiPiQg iW ZaV aV 
preposterous to establish a distinct study of legal problems in cyberspace as it would be to compile 
a distinct study of all the specialised interactions between horse-related activities and the law. 
Instead, Easterbrook asserted that the study of general rules is the best way to learn about the law 
aSSlicable WR VSecialiVed eQdeaYRXUV, aQd WhaW laZ VchRRl ³cRXUVeV VhRXld be liPiWed WR VXbjecWV WhaW 
could illXPiQaWe Whe eQWiUe laZ´.61 Lessig agreed that the illumination of the entire law should be the 
SXUSRVe Rf legal edXcaWiRQ, bXW aUgXed ³WhaW WheUe iV aQ iPSRUWaQW geQeUal SRiQW WhaW cRPeV fURP 
WhiQkiQg iQ SaUWicXlaU abRXW hRZ laZ aQd c\beUVSace cRQQecW´.62 In particular, Lessig argues that it 
shed light on ³Whe liPiWV RQ laZ aV a UegXlaWRU aQd abRXW Whe WechQiTXeV fRU eVcaSiQg WhRVe liPiWV´.63  
                                                 
58 Ryan CalR, µRRbRWicV aQd Whe LeVVRQV Rf C\beUlaZ¶ (2015) 103 CalifRUQia LaZ ReYieZ 513 See eVSeciall\ 550-562. 
59 A different way of putting this claim is that robotics and AI may merely constitute a hazard, but whether the legal 
order succumbs to the shock of that hazard depends upon the latent vulnerabilities of that system, and the exposure that 
that system has to the hazard. For an example of this differentiation (in the context of existential risk research) see Hin-
YaQ LiX, KUiVWiaQ CedeUYall LaXWa aQd MaWWhijV M MaaV, µGRYeUQiQg BRUiQg ASRcal\SVeV: A NeZ T\SRlRg\ Rf 
E[iVWeQWial VXlQeUabiliWieV aQd E[SRVXUeV fRU E[iVWeQWial RiVk ReVeaUch¶ (2018) 102 FXWXUeV 6. 
60 FUaQk H EaVWeUbURRk, µC\beUVSace aQd Whe LaZ Rf Whe HRUVe¶ (1996) 207 The University of Chicago Legal Forum 
11; LeVVig, µThe LaZ Rf Whe HRUVe¶ (Q 38). 
61 Easterbrook (n 60) 207. 
62 LeVVig, µThe LaZ Rf Whe HRUVe¶ (Q 37) 502. 
63 ibid. 
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Reconciling these positions requires aligning divergent impulses: on the one hand, legal problem-
solving seeks to fill gaps in the law to promote certainty and predictability; on the other hand, there 
may be much to learn about the structures and systems of the law from those very ambiguities and 
anomalies in legal principles and processes that are caused by technological disruption. At a general 
level then, jurists are trained to think in ways that resolve specific questions, in manners that re-
establish the existing legal equilibrium. Yet, this impulse also closes off those rare opportunities to 
examine the law from a different vantage point in light of a new technology. For instance, the 
perspective offered or provoked by AI reveals many of the tenuous presumptions and precepts upon 
which much of the law rests. The impulse to quickly close the gaps revealed by the introduction of 
AI also undermines legal doctrine, insofar as structural or systemic adaptations are not 
contemplated. Thus, studies at the intersection of AI and the law hold the potential to, as 
EaVWeUbURRk ShUaVed hiV challeQge, µillXPiQaWe Whe eQWiUe laZ¶.64 aQd µideQWif\ Whe liPiWV Rf Whe laZ 
as regulator and about the techniques for escaping those limits¶.65  
TR illXVWUaWe WhiV SRiQW, cRQVideU LeVVig¶V ideQWificaWiRQ Rf Whe fRXU UegXlaWRU\ PRdaliWieV iQ hiV effRUW 
to understand the impact of the cyber revolution on the legal system: law, social norms, market, and 
architecture/code. Identifying these modes of regulation significantly advanced understanding of the 
strategies for escaping the limits of law by subsuming law under a broader framework of regulatory 
strategies that could be deployed to the same behavioural end.66 This opened up the discussion of 
regulation beyond the confines of legal discussions that would not have been possible if we limited 
RXUVelYeV WR EaVWeUbURRk¶V WUadiWiRQal aSSURach. ThXV, Lessig not only provided an approach 
capable of illuminating the entire law, but also one that allowed us to view the law in a relational 
manner ± as one regulatory modality among others. This not only determined some of the 
boundaries and limitations of law, but also strategies for overcoming those limitations. This 
provides an example of the claim made above: that orthodox responses to a legal system 
destabilised by technological change close off potential avenues for greater insight and 
rejuvenation.  
BXildiQg XSRQ LeVVig¶V PRdel, Roger Brownsword has argued that the modalities of regulation may 
QRW be aWePSRUal aQd RYeUlaSSiQg, aV LeVVig¶V PRdel SUeVXPeV. TheUe Pa\ iQVWead be a distinct 
developmental arc to regulation that is facilitated by technological change.67 This developmental arc 
moves us away from reliance on traditional rule-based legal regulation, to the gradual deployment 
Rf V\VWePV Rf µWechQRlRgical PaQagePeQW¶, aV Whe UeTXiViWe WechQRlRgieV PaWXUe. BURZQVZRUd 
imagines three ideal-type generations of regulators. The first rely solely on normative signals being 
sent from the regulators to the regulatees; the second use design and (physical or technological) 
architecture to incentivise compliance with the behavioural norms; the third tries to build regulatory 
cRPSliaQce iQWR VRcial V\VWePV diUecWl\, RfWeQ b\ b\SaVViQg hXPaQ behaYiRXU. BURZQVZRUd¶V PRdel 
VXggeVWV a geQeUal SXVh aZa\ fURP µlaZ¶ aV Whe dRPiQaQW RU SUiPaU\ PRdaliW\ Rf UegXlaWiRQ (eYeQ if 
                                                 
64 Easterbrook (n 60) 207. 
65 LeVVig, µThe LaZ Rf Whe HRUVe¶ (Q 37) 502.  
66 LeVVig, µThe NeZ ChicagR SchRRl¶ (Q 37); LeVVig, µThe LaZ Rf Whe HRUVe¶ (Q 37). 
67 RRgeU BURZQVZRUd, µIQ Whe YeaU 2061: FURP LaZ WR TechQRlRgical MaQagePeQW¶ (2015) 7 LaZ, IQQRYaWiRQ aQd 
Technology 1. 
13 
 
this trend may not be readily evident), thereby diminishing the scope and force of law as well as 
legal procedures for checking the exercise of power.68 
Observing these subtle structural shifts in the law, in regulatory modalities, and in their particular 
configuration is one of the under-emphasised opportunities for legal research emerging out of the 
cyberlaw debate ± one that might usefully be built upon in contemporary discussions of AI. 
TheUe aUe alVR leVVRQV WR be leaUQed fURP UeceQW debaWeV iQ Whe field Rf µRRbRLaZ¶ cRQceUQiQg Whe 
disruptive impact of robotics technology on the law.69 
Ryan Calo initiated this debate through his attempt to draw out the lessons learnt from cyberlaw that 
would be applicable to the regulation of robotics. His claim was that robotics were poised to 
become the next transformative technology by combining the promiscuity of information with the 
capacity to inflict physical harm. His overarching aim was to identify the unique features of robotic 
technologies that make them legally interesting: an approach to regulation that seeks to identify 
ceUWaiQ ³eVVeQWial TXaliWieV´ Rf WechQRlRgieV aQd dUaZ RXW Whe legal iPSlicaWiRQV Rf WheVe TXaliWieV. 
For the internet, he argued, the relevant essential qualities were connection, community and control; 
in contrast, he claimed that the essential qualities of robotics were embodiment, emergence and 
social valence.70 Taken in turn, embodiment is the physical presence of robots and the physical 
impact or manipulation made possible by robotics. Emergence encompasses the greater latitude of 
behaviour than mere programming might dictate, raising the question of effective or exclusive 
control that leads to the prospect of unpredictability and uncertainty by design. Finally, social 
valence invokes the different feelings that robots trigger among those who interact with them. The 
feeling is that robots constitute a separate ontological category, not quite agent but not quite object 
either. The overarching question for robotics regulation from this perspective is the extent to which 
robots are exceptional when compared to other technologies.71 ThXV, CalR¶V aSSURach WR URbRWicV 
regulation attempts to distil stable and inherent characteristics that robots possess, which can then 
be facWRUed iQWR aQ µe[ceSWiRQaliVP¶ calcXlXV WR deWeUPiQe ZheWheU RU QRW URbRWs create or reveal 
exceptional systemic challenges to the existing law or legal order.  
Jack Balkin¶V response to Calo argued for a more contextualised approach to the regulation of 
URbRWicV. BalkiQ VXggeVWed WhaW Whe ³eVVeQWial TXaliWieV´ aSSURach ZaV PiVleading, because it implied 
that the challenges raised by the technologies are independent from the use of those technologies 
and their mediation of human relations. As such, the essential qualities approach insulates the 
characteristics of the technology from contextual considerations which likely raise a very different 
set of challenges than might be predicted by examining the essential qualities in isolation. 
Furthermore, he argued that CalR¶V aSSURach Pa\ XQjXVWifiabl\ RVVif\ a VeW Rf cRQWiQgeQW eVVeQWial 
qualities and the challenges they pose, whereas in reality robotics regulation is likely to be an 
organic process of continual negotiation and renegotiation.  
                                                 
68 LiX, µThe PRZeU SWUXcWXUe Rf AUWificial IQWelligeQce¶ (Q 8); HiQ-YaQ LiX, µThe DigiWal DiVUXSWiRQ Rf HXPaQ RighWV 
FRXQdaWiRQV¶, Human Rights, Digital Society and the Law: a Research Companion (Routledge 2019). 
69 CalR, µRRbRWicV aQd Whe LeVVRQV Rf C\beUlaZ¶ (Q 58); BalkiQ (Q 57). 
70 CalR, µRRbRWicV aQd Whe LeVVRQV Rf C\beUlaZ¶ (Q 58) 532±548. 
71 IQ CalR¶V cRQceSWiRQ, ³a WechQRlRg\ iV e[ceSWiRQal if iW iQYiWeV a V\VWePic chaQge WR laZV RU legal iQVWiWXWiRQV iQ RUdeU 
WR SUeVeUYe RU UebalaQce eVWabliVhed YalXeV.´ ibid 553. 
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Balkin proposed that salience should instead be the organisational framework for robotics 
regulation. Regulators should ask: what is foregrounded and what is relegated through the 
introduction of the technology? This in turn captures two factors: that salience depends upon the use 
of the technology, including uses that were neither intended nor foreseen; and that technology 
mediates social interactions, in part by creating new opportunities for power and control.72 Thus, 
salience captures both how people interact with new inventions as well as how people interact with 
other people through those new inventions. This approach allows us to see past projections of 
contemporary concerns that are espoused by the essential qualities approach and embraces the 
dynamic social world that is the scene of regulation.  
The salience approach also enables regulatory initiatives to grapple with complex interaction effects 
between the technology and human society, rather than assuming µcRPSle[ XVage¶ to be an essential 
quality of the technology. Interaction effects are by definition dynamic. While similar ideas of 
unforeseeability and unpredictability are captured within Calo¶V cRQceSW Rf ePeUgeQce, hiV aSSURach 
is much more static because it defines emergence as one of the essential properties of robots and not 
something that arises from social use. Because of this, the salience approach offers benefits over the 
essential qualities approach, which may be overly restrictive for three reasons.  
First, as Balkin observes, that approach projects contemporary concerns into the future. While such 
projection may be unavoidable, the essential qualities approach ossifies present concerns about the 
fXWXUe aV WhRVe WhaW aUe SaUaPRXQW iQ iPSRUWaQce, eYeQ if Whe cRQfigXUaWiRQ Rf µeVVeQWial TXaliWieV¶ 
might alter over time. He describes how legal scholarship on cyberspace altered over time, as the 
technology saw different usage. Thus, a scholar writing in 1991, he argues, might well perceive that 
³Whe IQWeUQeW¶V ³eVVeQWial´ feaWXUeV ZeUe iWV abiliWieV WR cURVV jXUiVdicWiRQal liQeV aW Zill, WR VeQd 
digital information quickly and cheaply, aQd WR faciliWaWe aQRQ\PRXV cRPPXQicaWiRQ´.73 By 1999, 
however, as it became increasingly clear that the degree of online anonymity was overstated and 
that states could control features of Internet traffic, dominant legal concerns instead turned to 
filtering and surveillance. Then b\ 2008, Whe IQWeUQeW¶V dRPiQaQW feaWXUeV VeePed WR be ³Whe abiliW\ 
to lower the cost of organization, to facilitate crowdsourcing and open-source projects, and to 
undercut professional norms of information production in areas ranging from music to journalism to 
VcieQce.´74 ThXV, CalR¶V accRXQW UeflecWed a VSecific VQaSVhRW Rf Whe WechQRlRg\ UaWheU WhaQ a 
WiPeleVV accRXQW Rf Whe WechQRlRg\¶V iPPXWable chaUacWeUiVWicV.  
Second, the list of identified essential qualities, beyond being somewhat arbitrary and contingent to 
its specific time, may also be forever incomplete.75 For instance, early international treaties 
governing naval warfare included prohibitions on firing on civilian vessels without prior warning, 
and established a duty to rescue survivors. Rebecca Crootof, however, has discussed how the rise of 
VXbPaUiQe ZaUfaUe fXQcWiRQall\ RYeUWXUQed aVVXPSWiRQV abRXW ZhaW PighW be WeUPed aV µeVVeQWial 
TXaliWieV¶ Rf QaYal PiliWaU\ WechQRlRg\ ± namely the presumption of the dominance of surface 
vessels with spare capacity to accommodate survivors ± with the result that customary international 
                                                 
72 LiX, µThe PRZeU SWUXcWXUe Rf AUWificial IQWelligeQce¶ (Q 8). 
73 Balkin (n 57) 47. 
74 ibid 48. 
75 MaWWhijV M MaaV, µIQQRYaWiRQ-Proof Governance for Military AI? How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the 
BRW¶ (2019) 10 JRXUQal Rf IQWeUQaWiRQal HXPaQiWaUiaQ Legal SWXdieV 129. 
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laZ UeQdeUed Whe e[iVWiQg WUeaW\ UegiPe µjXUiVSUXdeQWial VSace jXQk¶.76 The problem with it being 
impossible to exhaustively consider or list all µeVVeQWial TXaliWieV¶ is inherent to any dichotomous 
taxonomy: what methodology is utilised to identify these essential characteristics, and in particular 
what are the threshold values, and the mechanisms for promoting and demoting characteristics over 
time? With a necessarily incomplete list of essential qualities, the prospects of designing a robust 
regulatory framework for AI diminishes. 
Third, the essential qualities approach is overly isolating and introspective in approach, which may 
result in falVe SRViWiYeV RU falVe QegaWiYeV. LRRkiQg VRlel\ aW Zhich aVVXPed µeVVeQWial 
chaUacWeUiVWicV¶ Rf aQ ePeUgiQg WechQRlRg\ Pa\ becRPe challeQgiQg can give clues as to the 
problems that could conceivably arise, but whether those problems actually become a widespread 
phenomenon depends upon contextual factors and usage.  
But how does the essential qualities and salience debate factor into the earlier critiques against 
adopting a piecemeal approach?77 At first glance, it would appear that the essential qualities 
approach can be read as being more in line with the spirit of an holistic approach insofar as it seeks 
out the root causes of the disruptive challenge and directs attention and responses to those root 
causes. This would also suggest that the salience approach is more piecemeal by virtue of its 
contextual and reaction character. Yet, we would suggest that the opposite conclusion holds true: 
that the essential qualities approach is, almost by definition, more piecemeal as a direct result of the 
need to select or foreground certain characteristics above others as those meriting attention and 
being definitive of the new technology. Since it would be impossible to take into consideration all 
the characteristics of a new technology, and since it would defeat the purpose of the analysis if the 
essential criteria were removed, the essential qualities approach is not as holistic as it might appear 
to be. Conversely, by taking into consideration the broader contexts into which a new technology is 
deployed, the salience approach is less piecemeal even though it is more contingent ± in other 
words, the context is a core aspect of forging a holistic response.  
As should be clear from this, Ze aUe PRUe V\PSaWheWic WR BalkiQ¶V aSSURach, aQd iQ SaUWicXlaU WR hiV 
point that embodiment does not constitute an essential quality that sets robotics aside from other 
manifestations of AI. The core challenge introduced by robotics and AI is not necessarily that non-
human entities are the means through which actions are performed, but rather that they can have an 
influence over the ends that society pursues.  
But while RXU V\PSaWhieV lie clRVeU WR Whe cRQWe[WXaliVaWiRQ eVSRXVed b\ BalkiQ¶V ³ValieQce´ 
criterion, there remain shortcomings with his approach as well. In his own words: 
When we consider how a new technology affects law, our focus should not be on 
what is essential about the technology but on what features of social life the 
technology makes newly salient. What problems does a new technology place in the 
foreground that were previously underemphasized or deemed less important? What 
                                                 
76 Rebecca CURRWRf, µJXUiVSUXdeQWial SSace JXQk: TUeaWieV aQd NeZ TechQRlRgieV¶ iQ ChiaUa GiRUgeWWi aQd NaWalie KleiQ 
(eds), Resolving Conflicts in the Law (2019) <https://brill.com/view/book/edcoll/9789004316539/BP000015.xml> 
acceVVed 15 MaUch 2019; See alVR Whe diVcXVViRQ iQ MaWWhijV M MaaV, µIQWeUQaWiRQal LaZ DReV NRW CRPSXWe: AUWificial 
IQWelligeQce aQd The DeYelRSPeQW, DiVSlacePeQW RU DeVWUXcWiRQ Rf Whe GlRbal Legal OUdeU¶ (2019) 20 MelbRXUQe 
Journal of International Law 29, 36±38. 
77 We would like to thank Roger Brownsword for the ideas developed in this section.  
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aspects of human activity or of the human condition does a technological change 
foreground, emphasize, or problematize? And once technology moves a certain 
problem or a certain feature of our lives from the background to the foreground of 
our concern, what are the consequences for human freedom?78 
From this passage, it becomes clear that salient features of a technology are those that impinge upon 
latent aspects of social life: in other words that the problems are revealed by the technology, and not 
necessarily created nor introduced by the technology. Thus, while Balkin recognises the shifts in 
social relations that are triggered by new technologies, he at least understates the fact that new 
technologies can create both new problems as well as novel categories of problems.  
A related shortcoming of the salience approach to regulation is that there is no metric provided that 
gauges the relative importance or severity of the features that are elevated or relegated by the 
technology. As a measure of relevance, the salience approach is capable of sifting through problems 
that are brought to light or magnified by the technology, but once a problem is deemed to be salient, 
there is no further hierarchy to organise and prioritise regulatory responses. In a sense, with the 
salience approach the pendulum has swung to the opposite extreme to that of the essential qualities 
approach: where the former emphasises relevance and social dynamics, the latter focuses upon 
ranking inherent features of the technology. This suggests that even the salience approach to 
robotics regulation remains incomplete, and that it is the first step of a multistage procedure that 
would structure the regulatory challenges posed by AI and robotics by importance or impact, after a 
particular feature has been deemed to raise salient considerations. 
 
3. Artificial Intelligence and Legal Disruption  
 
We now turn to our proposed model of AI-induced legal disruption, which we call Whe µLegal 
DisUXSWiRQ MRdel¶. This model is both a lens to identify which new problems will prove to be the 
most structurally challenging for regulation, and is also a theoretical attempt to draw on the 
disruptive potential of AI in order to generate new perspectives upon the workings of law and legal 
system itself. 
An important assumption framing this model is that only AI or the manifestations of AI that are 
capable of fundamentally displacing certain core legal presumptions, subvert legal principles, or 
systematically diVWRUW Whe fXQcWiRQiQg Rf Whe legal V\VWeP Zill be cRQVideUed µlegall\ diVUXSWiYe¶.79 In 
other words, AI systems and their manifestations must raise structural or systemic challenges to 
regulation and governance to be included within this model. As such, the legal disruption 
                                                 
78 Balkin (n 57) 46±47. Emphasis original. 
79 Legal disruption, as a general concept or approach, can be applied to anything that is capable of destabilising legal 
principles of practices. For example, the rise of the Private Military Company, a private corporation providing martial 
services for profit disrupts the legal mechanisms structuring control and responsibility for the use of force in situations 
of armed conflict. Hin-Yan Liu, LaZ¶s Impunit\: Responsibilit\ and the Modern Private Militar\ Compan\ (Hart 
Publishing 2015). This suggests that the Private Military Company is capable of legal disruption, at least in those legal 
areas associated with armed conflict and criminal conduct until legal doctrine proves capable of accommodating for its 
status and activities. In this context, the application of legal disruption to artificial intelligence is just a special and 
particularly visible case.  
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framework sets a high threshold for engagement with AI and is aimed only at identifying aspects of 
technological change which are turbulent and affect the foundations of the legal and regulatory 
order. Although we present this model an attempt to address the impact of AI, we believe it has 
broader utility and could be applied to other debates about disruptive technologies and their impact 
on the legal system. This will become apparent in our description of the model. We first discuss the 
model and then outline some of its advantages and disadvantages. 
 
Stage One: The Disruptive Moments 
 
The Legal Disruption MRdel VWaUWV ZiWh Whe µdiVUXSWiYe PRPeQW¶ WhaW iV heUalded RQce acWRUV ZiWhiQ 
the legal system perceive the injection of AI systems into society as creating legally relevant 
problems.80 It invokes the idea that the legal and regulatory system is thrown into dis-equilibrium as 
a result of AI itself, or of the resultant sociotechnical change that is (perceived to be) brought about 
by its adoption. Implicit in the legal disruption model, then, is the idea of a relatively sharp and 
identifiable departure from the ordinary legal and regulatory processes currently at play.  
So the first question is: how does this disruptive moment come about, and how can we identify it 
when it does? In this context, it might be analytically productive to draw on the specific concept of 
µaffRUdaQceV¶ to explain the process of disruption. An outline of this argument, which we will 
unpack in detail below, is that new social challenges often result when new technologies are 
translated into new affordances, i.e. new possibilities for behaviour or action in our personal and 
social environments.81 Disruptive moments can come about when new technologies generate or 
otherwise reveal or unlock new affordances; when such affordances are actualized (they are 
recognized and acted upon); and when the resulting behaviour is deemed a problem or a hazard by 
the legal system.82  
While it may be tempting to deploy the concept of affordances in a manner that directly connects AI 
applications to the new possibilities for new behaviours, this is only one part of the overall 
contribution that the affordances approach might present. A new technology like AI may indeed 
enable behaviours or outcomes that have been desirable, yet hitherto impossible. Yet, there are at 
least two other ways that the concept of affordances may be connected to the disruptive moment. In 
                                                 
80 OQe cRXld alVR cRPSaUe WhiV ZiWh BUXce AckeUPaQ¶V ViPilaU (WhRXgh diVWiQcW) cRQceSW Rf a µcRQVWiWXWiRQal PRPeQW¶; 
see Bruce Ackerman, We the People, Volume 1: Foundations (Reprint edition, Belknap Press: An Imprint of Harvard 
University Press 1993); Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Volume 2: Transformations (Belknap Press: An Imprint of 
HaUYaUd UQiYeUViW\ PUeVV 2000); AQd fRU a cUiWiTXe, Vee Michael J KlaUPaQ, µCRQVWiWXWiRQal FacW/CRQVWiWXWiRQal FicWiRQ: 
A CUiWiTXe Rf BUXce AckeUPaQ¶V TheRU\ Rf CRQVWiWXWiRQal MRPeQWV¶ (1992) 44 Stanford Law Review 759.  
81 Bennett Moses (n 50) 591: (³WheQ laZ\eUV claiP WR be iQWeUeVWed iQ iVVXeV VXUURXQdiQg laZ aQd WechQRlRg\, iW iV 
usually related to questions of how the law ought to relate to activities, entities, and relationships made possible by a 
new technology. As technology changes, we can do things, make things, and form connections that were not previously 
SUacWicable.´). 
82 The relationship may be more subtle than this, because new kinds of responses can be facilitated by these new 
technologies. This is a distinction that we elaborate upon below in relation to intrinsic and extrinsic versions of legal 
disruption. 
18 
 
the section that follows, we first set out an adapted version of the three different types of 
affordances and then discuss the implications this has in the lead up to the disruptive moment.  
Legal Disruption Arising from New Affordances 
The cRQceSW Rf µaffRUdaQce¶ ZaV iQWURdXced by James Gibson to make simultaneous reference to all 
action possibilities available to an animal in its environment:83 µWhe affordances of the environment 
are what it offers the animal, what it provides or furnishes, eiWheU fRU gRRd RU ill¶.84 Thus, the 
concept of affordances initially mapped onto the potentialities of the environment for an agent. The 
concept of affordances was subsequently adapted and popularised by Don Norman in the context of 
(technological) artefacts: 
 The term affordance refers to the relationship between a physical object and a person (or for 
 that matter, any interacting agent, whether animal or human, or even machines and robots). 
 An affordance is a relationship between the properties of an object and the capabilities of the 
 agent that determine just how the object could possibly be used.85 
In addition to emphasising the relational dimension of affordances, Norman also further 
distinguished affordances from signifiers: µAffRUdaQceV deWeUPiQe ZhaW actions are possible. 
SigQifieUV cRPPXQicaWe ZheUe Whe acWiRQ VhRXld Wake Slace. We Qeed bRWh.¶86 For Norman, 
separating out signifiers from affordances remedied the question of recognition becaXVe µ[W]o 
Gibson, an affordance exists whether or not anyone ever notices it. To the designer, if affordances 
are not known, then they might as well not exist. In other words, the designer is primarily concerned 
with perceived affRUdaQceV; Whe SeUceSWiRQ iV cUiWical¶.87  
This refinement becomes especially pertinent for our model of legal disruption because the range of 
possible actions open to an agent in the designed virtual, or the virtually-mediated, realm hinges 
upon those opportunities that the agent actually registers as possibilities ± recognition that hinges 
upon successful signifiers. This is important when the designed or engineered world effectively 
becomes synthetic88 or artefactual,89 and differs from the physical world with respect to our habitual 
and intuitive sense of the possibilities and limitations on our behaviour. Furthermore, if artificial 
intelligence does in fact invoke the artefactual, either in the virtual worlds it creates or in the 
mediation between us and the worlds that we perceive and inhabit, there is the further consideration 
that the artefact is created expressly to serve human interests and ends.90 If this distinction holds, the 
question of affordances and signifiers become a central arena of contestation because they precede, 
and therefore occlude, other forms of regulation or behavioural influences. This why Norman 
                                                 
83 Most famously in JaPeV J GibVRQ, µThe EcRlRgical ASSURach WR Whe ViVXal PeUceSWiRQ Rf PicWXUeV¶ (1978) 11 
Leonardo 227. 
84 James J Gibson, The Ecological Approach To Visual Perception (Erlbaum 1986) 127. Note that Gibson was a 
SV\chRlRgiVW VSecialiViQg iQ YiVXal SeUceSWiRQ, heQce Whe UefeUeQce WR µaQiPal¶ aQd µeQYiURQPeQW¶. 
85 Donald A Norman, The Design of Everyday Things (MIT Press 2013) 11. 
86 ibid 13. 
87 Donald A Norman, Living with Complexity (MIT Press 2016) 228. Emphasis original. 
88 Christopher J Preston, The Synthetic Age: Outdesigning Evolution, Resurrecting Species, and Reengineering Our 
World (MIT Press 2019). 
89 Keekok Lee, The Natural and the Artefactual: The Implications of Deep Science and Deep Technology for 
Environmental Philosophy (Lexington Books 1999). 
90 ibid. 
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demanded that µDeVigQeUV aUe VWill UeVSRQVible fRU eQVXUiQg WhaW Whe RbjecWV aQd V\VWePV Whe\ deVigQ 
have the proper affordances, but if they are not noticed or perceived, then they will probably fail to 
achieve their purpose. The designer must communicate the range of actions through signifiers. 
SigQifieUV aUe cUiWical WR effecWiYe cRPPXQicaWiRQ¶.91  
The crucial difference between design and disruption in the context of affordances is thus the 
perception and realisation of what might be done. In the former, design serves a particular purpose, 
aim, or objective, and the role of affordances and attendant signifiers is to facilitate people to 
achieve the ends that are served by the designed artefact. In the latter, the prospect for disruption 
inheres in the potential absence of signifiers and in the broad, yet unperceived or unrealised, 
affordances that may lurk within a particular artefact or system. Thus, disruptive moments can arise 
from sudden or lurching discoveries of affordances that were hitherto hidden or opaque, or, at any 
rate, lacking effective signifiers. Put differently, it appears as though disruption invokes a more raw 
Gibsonian understanding of affordances, which exist whether or not they are recognised, with the 
disruptive moment taking place when a hitherto hidden affordance is suddenly perceived and acted 
upon. In this line of thinking, the disruptive moment need not (only) inhere in the invention of a 
particular technology: rather, disruption (also) arises when new uses for that technology are 
recognised and deployed. This reaffirms the cascades of disruptive effects that follow from the 
invention of revolutionary technologies: as a µgeQeUal SXUSRVe WechQRlRg\¶,92 the vast space of 
potential use cases for AI unfold gradually, yet in a potentially disruptive manner, within this 
conceptual model of affordances. This downplays the role of the technology itself in the process of 
legal disruption, and instead shifts the focus to the social, political, and cultural dimensions that 
spark crises for the legal order.  
To explore this relationship between affordances and legal disruption, we appeal to an additional 
distinction that Vlad GlăYeaQX has previously drawn between three types of affordances: (a) 
³uniQYeQWed affRUdaQceV´, cRQQRWiQg Whe cXUUeQW lack Rf a WechQRlRgical caSaciW\; (b) ³XQSeUceiYed 
affRUdaQceV´, iPSl\iQg Whe lack Rf aZaUeQeVV Rf a QeZ affRUdaQce; aQd (c) ³XQe[SlRiWed 
affRUdaQceV´ Zhich iQYRlYe normative resistance against pursuing particular forms of behaviour 
which are otherwise possible and realisable.93 In the context of AI, examples of these three types of 
affRUdaQceV cRXld be (a) µPiQd XSlRadiQg¶ RU µZhRle bUaiQ ePXlaWiRQ¶; (b) µ]eUR-da\¶ Vecurity 
vulnerabilities or back routes into certain systems, for instance the susceptibility of a specific AI 
aUchiWecWXUe WR SaUWicXlaU µadYeUVaUial iQSXW¶;94 (c) the use of AI systems for optimizing the 
                                                 
91 Norman (n 87) 229±230. 
92 TUajWeQbeUg (Q 7); AgUaZal, GaQV aQd GRldfaUb (Q 7) SW 1µAI aV a GPT¶. 
93 Vlad P GlăYeaQX, µWhaW CaQ Be DRQe ZiWh aQ Egg? CUeaWiYiW\, MaWeUial ObjecWV, aQd Whe TheRU\ Rf AffRUdaQceV¶ 
(2012) 46 The Journal of Creative Behavior 192, 196±199. We particularly refer the reader to the visualization on page 
197 and we slightly altered the original categories for relevance and consistency in this paper.  
94 For obvious reasons, it is hard for us to VSecXlaWe, iQ adYaQce, abRXW e[aPSleV Rf µXQSeUceiYed affRUdaQceV¶ RffeUed 
b\ AI V\VWePV. ReceQW ZRUk RQ Whe VXVceSWibiliW\ Rf AI V\VWePV WR µadYeUVaUial iQSXW¶, hRZeYeU, VXggeVWV Ze PighW 
expect many such systems to have such vulnerabilities that allow exploitation. IaQ J GRRdfellRZ aQd RWheUV, µAWWackiQg 
MachiQe LeaUQiQg ZiWh AdYeUVaUial E[aPSleV¶ (OpenAI, 16 February 2017) <https://openai.com/blog/adversarial-
example-research/> accessed 18 February 2017. 
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effectiveness of torture respectively.95 Which of these types of affordances are the most relevant 
from the perspective of legal disruption? 
In the most straightforward and direct sense, the introduction of a new technology overcomes the 
µuniQYeQWed affRUdaQceV¶ RbVWacle because that new technology makes achievable certain 
possibilities of action that are already sought by individuals and society. Put into the context of the 
above debate between essential qualities and salience, µuniQYeQWed affRUdaQceV¶ aSSeaU WR fall in line 
with the former because the focus is placed upon what is technologically novel and possible, 
thereby also aligning this approach with those that treat technology as the regulatory target.96 For 
instance: the desire towards implementing systems of surveillance that make social life completely 
µWUaQVSaUeQW¶, µlegible¶ aQd cRQWURllable RU SURfiWable, iV VXUel\ QRW QeZ. Indeed this has been one 
that various actors have long harboured, for strategic or political reasons.97 Yet the introduction of 
many sensor technologies, coupled with big data and AI analysis, may have rendered widespread 
systems of such pervasive surveillance aQd µalgRcUac\¶ (PXch PRUe) SRVVible.98 As the past lack of 
technical capacity has been overcome, such situations often appear as though the new technology 
has unlocked or revealed new types of behaviour in a direct manner. It may even be treated as the 
technological disruption of society, whereby a technological application or artefact is conceived of 
as an independent external hazard that impacts and destabilises societal equilibria. For example, a 
stated aim in relation to IHL is to reduce unnecessary and superfluous suffering in the conduct of 
armed hostilities. The prospect of introducing autonomous weapons systems, from the perspective 
of their advocates, is that superior compliance with both the principles of distinction and 
proportionality at the heart of IHL is now made possible by the military applications of AI. Thus, 
the presently-desirable objectives in IHL align with the promised capabilities of AI in the 
battlefield, making it appear as WhURXgh AI haV RYeUcRPe Whe µuniQYeQWed affRUdaQce¶ RbVWacle. YeW, 
this potentially leads to the destabilisation of the framework that regulates armed conflict in that 
legal objections to autonomous weapons systems that are grounded in IHL become neutralised, 
perhaps to the point where the deployment of such weapons systems become morally virtuous or 
obligatory.99  
This first category of affordance, however, might overshadow the other two categories of 
affordances, because the presence or absence of a new technology is only a part of the equation of 
legal disruption. It is therefore critical that the model of legal disruption is not overly blinkered to 
take into account only, or primarily, disruptive moments arising from uninvented affordances. 
Different types of disruptive moments can also arise when ³XQSeUceiYed affRUdaQce´ aQd 
                                                 
95 However, see, unfortunately, APaQda McAlliVWeU, µSWUaQgeU WhaQ ScieQce FicWiRQ: The RiVe Rf A.I. IQWeUURgaWiRQ iQ 
the Dawn of Autonomous Robots and the Need for an AddiWiRQal PURWRcRl WR Whe U.N. CRQYeQWiRQ AgaiQVW TRUWXUe¶ 
[2018] Minnesota Law Review 47. 
96 Gary Marchant, Braden Allenby and Joseph Herkert (eds), The Growing Gap Between Emerging Technologies and 
Legal-Ethical Oversight: The Pacing Problem (Springer 2011). 
97 OQ Whe lRQg hiVWRUical dUiYe, b\ (eVSeciall\ PRdeUQiVW) VWaWeV RU eliWeV, WRZaUdV UeQdeUiQg VRcieWieV µlegible¶, Vee JC 
Scott, Seeing Like a State - How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed. (Yale University 
Press 1998).  
98 Cf. Shoshana Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Human Future at the New Frontier of 
Power (1 edition, PublicAffairs 2019); JohQ DaQaheU, µThe ThUeaW Rf AlgRcUac\: RealiW\, ReViVWaQce aQd 
AccRPPRdaWiRQ¶ (2016) 29 PhilRVRSh\ & TechQRlRg\ 245. 
99 LiX, µFURP Whe AXWRQRP\ FUaPeZRUk WRZaUdV NeWZRUkV aQd S\VWePV ASSURacheV fRU ³AXWRQRPRXV´ WeaSRQV 
S\VWePV¶ (Q 53). 
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³XQe[SlRiWed affRUdaQce´ RbVWacleV aUe RYeUcRPe: iQ RWheU ZRUdV, ZheQ QeZ SRVVibiliWieV fRU 
behaviour or action are recognised, and separately, are exploited. Such disruptive moments are 
unlike instances of what might appear as technological disruption because the switch from a 
unperceived affordance to a recognised possibility for behaviour, or from an unexploited affordance 
to an exploited possibility for action can be much more abrupt. This is because there need not be a 
manifest technological innovation to serve as a regulatory focal point, and also because such 
switches can be temporally and causally disconnected from a given technological innovation, unlike 
that which transformed an uninvented affordance into a technically-enabled possibility for 
behaviour.  
Continuing the example of military applications of AI, the build up to a disruptive moment in the 
shift from an unperceived affordance to a recognised possibility for behaviour precipitating a 
disruptive moment could involve the realisation that autonomous weapons systems could be 
deployed in the battlefield. This raises the familiar questions surrounding control and 
responsibility,100 but also questions around structural strategic pressures created by the very 
appearance of this technology.101 These potentially disruptive moments need not address actual 
scenarios, in other words the unexploited affordance need not be overcome, because some legal 
challenges can be projected out from plausibly hypothetical use cases. Indeed, attempts at 
regulation can take place in anticipatory fashion in relation to the unrecognised affordances barriers. 
IQ VRPe caVeV, µSUeYeQWaWiYe fUaPeZRUkV¶ haYe SURYeQ able WR anticipate and ban the use of 
imminent technologies such as exploding bullets or blinding lasers.102 In other cases, such 
scholarship prejudged the actual state (or even viability) of the technology in question in a way that 
now seems odd: consider, for example, the 1960s international legal scholarship proposing a 
µCeQWeU Rf Whe EaUWh TUeaW\¶; Whe 1970V SURSRValV WR UegXlaWe ZeaWheU cRQWURl WechQRlRg\; RU Whe 
1982 Deep Sea Bed Mining Provisions in the 1982 Law of the Sea.103  
It is thus worth noting that these aUe µjXVW¶ VRcial SURblePV: new technologies and the capacities that 
these enable may be the trigger or the catalyst, but the new technology cannot be considered as the 
root cause of these unrecognised affordances. As the disruptive moments that flow from 
unrecognised affordances are centred upon recognition and social change, these can be very sudden 
and abrupt as they cannot be directly inferred from the development or deployment of a new 
technology qua technology. From this perspective, the examples of the seemingly odd pre-emptive 
regulations drafted to meet new technologies that never actually materialised raised just above 
might appear to be prudent preparations. Insofar as unrecognised affordances can precipitate legally 
disruptive moments once the recognition hurdle is cleared, a rational hedge against legal disruption 
would be to prepare the legal system against the range of challenges that might reasonably be 
                                                 
100 Bhuta Nehal and others (eds), Autonomous Weapons Systems: Law, Ethics, Policy (Cambridge University Press 
2016). 
101 cf. Zwetsloot and Dafoe (n 19). 
102 DeQiVe GaUcia, µFXWXUe AUPV, TechQRlRgieV, aQd IQWeUQaWiRQal LaZ: PUeYeQWiYe SecXUiW\ GRYeUQaQce¶ (2016) 1 
European JourQal Rf IQWeUQaWiRQal SecXUiW\ 94; DeQiVe GaUcia, µLeWhal AUWificial IQWelligeQce aQd ChaQge: The FXWXUe Rf 
IQWeUQaWiRQal Peace aQd SecXUiW\¶ (2018) 20 IQWeUQaWiRQal SWXdieV ReYieZ 334; M\UiaP DXQQ CaYelW\, SRShie-Charlotte 
FiVcheU aQd ThieUU\ Bal]acT, µ³KilleU RRbRWV´ aQd PUeYeQWaWiYe AUPV CRQWURl¶, Routledge Handbook of Security 
Studies (Routledge 2016). 
103 Picker (n 14) 184±187; For the case of envisioned weather control technology, see Edith Brown Weiss, 
µIQWeUQaWiRQal ReVSRQVeV WR WeaWheU MRdificaWiRQ¶ (1975) 29 IQWeUQaWiRQal OUgaQi]aWiRQ 805. 
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foreseen in the more obvious and observable development of new technologies. Of course, the 
realities of a treaty-based response might counterintuitively render the legal system more 
susceptible to legal disruption from unrecognised affordances by ossifying a set of pre-identified 
legal challenges and thus eroding the adaptability and responsiveness of legal responses more 
broadly to meet those new challenges. It would seem then that preventative frameworks have their 
virtues in response to unrecognised affordances, but these must necessarily retain a high degree of 
flexibility and adaptability to function appropriately for the heavily contextual nature of such 
challenges.  
Finally, there are the disruptive moments that flow from breaking the unexploited affordances 
obstacle, in our case where new uses for AI are deployed. For example, the actual deployment of 
military AI applications in the battlefield will likely precipitate legally disruptive moments that may 
be different from those that were identified and discussed prior to the watershed event of actual 
usage. While such examples are harder to pin down, we can draw upon a recent proposal to connect 
AI with the US nuclear force in response to the challenges of attack-time compression that threatens 
to destabilise present deterrence strategy.104 This presents an AI use case that has overcome the 
invented and unrecognised affordance hurdles, but which at present is limited by the unexploited 
affordance barrier due to important outstanding concerns.105 If and when this final barrier against 
exploiting these new possibilities is broken, we can expect a new and independent set of disruptive 
moments to flow from this reversal.   
In practice, both the unrecognised and unexploited affordance hurdles often trail behind 
technological innovation,106 and we present a sequential way of considering the affordances 
approach to the disruptive moment below. This trailing dissociates the legal, regulatory of 
governance disruption that is observed, from the original technological innovation that set the 
affordance cascades into motion. The point raised here from a legal disruption perspective is an 
important one: legally disruptive moments need not be neatly coupled to the technologies that are 
deemed to precipitate them. While legally disruptive effects may be hinged to new technologies 
when overcoming uninvented affordance obstacles, we can also expect a cascade of other less 
obvious forms of legal disruption to follow as a consequence of new affordances that subsequently 
break through the unperceived and unexploited affordances obstacles (and to which the new 
technology does not necessarily have a direct bearing), leading to new behaviours and generating 
new social challenges.  
                                                 
104 AdaP LRZWheU aQd CXUWiV McGiffiQ, µAPeUica NeedV a ³Dead HaQd´¶ (War on the Rocks, 16 August 2019) 
<https://warontherocks.com/2019/08/america-needs-a-dead-hand/> accessed 2 September 2019.  
105 MaWW Field, µSWUaQgelRYe RedX[: US E[SeUWV PURSRVe HaYiQg AI CRQWURl NXcleaU WeaSRQV¶ (Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists, 30 August 2019) <https://thebulletin.org/2019/08/strangelove-redux-us-experts-propose-having-ai-control-
nuclear-ZeaSRQV/> acceVVed 2 SeSWePbeU 2019; PaYel ShaUikRY, µAUWificial IQWelligeQce, C\beUaWWack, aQd NXcleaU 
Weapons²A DaQgeURXV CRPbiQaWiRQ¶ (2018) 74 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 368; Shahar Avin and SM Amadae, 
µAXWRQRP\ aQd MachiQe LeaUQiQg aW Whe IQWeUface Rf NXcleaU WeaSRQV, CRPSXWeUV aQd PeRSle¶ iQ V BRXlaQiQ (ed), 
The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Strategic Stability and Nuclear Risk (Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute 2019) <https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/297703> accessed 16 October 2019; Although see for 
UeceQW deYelRSPeQWV: Michael T KlaUe, µ³Sk\QeW´ ReYiViWed: The DaQgeURXV AllXUe Rf NXcleaU CRPPaQd AXWRPaWiRQ¶ 
(2020) 50 AUPV CRQWURl TRda\; WaVhiQgWRQ 10; JaPeV JRhQVRQ, µDelegaWiQg SWUaWegic DeciViRQ-Making to Machines: 
DU. SWUaQgelRYe RedX[?¶ (2020) 0 JRXUQal Rf SWUaWegic SWXdieV 1. 
106 This has been under-appreciated in the context of disruptive moments, because this process may proceed at different 
rates in different spheres of activity. See for instance: Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee, The Second Machine 
Age: Work, Progress and Prosperity in a Time of Brilliant Technologies (WW Norton & Company 2014) 72±88. 
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It is especially worth noting here that the nature and capabilities of a new technology are most 
relevant in terms of uninvented affordances, because the plausibility of forecasting the kinds of new 
behaviours that can be associated with the configuration of that new technology might still be 
retained. When it comes to the unrecognised and the unexploited affordance obstacles, however, the 
connection between forms of legal disruption and the characteristics of the new technology at play 
both becomes highly complex and continues to unfold over time. This is because the range of 
recognised and exploited uses of a new technology can depart radically from its designed or 
intended use. Furthermore, because realisation breakthroughs depend upon recognition and 
exploitation of (new, technologically-underpinned) possibilities, these can take place more 
suddenly, at a faster pace, and move in non-intuitive directions. This suggests a contextual 
dimension to legal disruption in that there will be differential regulatory impacts flowing from a 
particular technology among different jurisdictions and legal orders. 
Breaking down a disruptive moment along these lines suggests that there will be different types of 
disruptive moments precipitated by new and emerging technologies, and that the manner in which 
these moments are constituted, and the ways in which they drive legal disruption, will differ 
depending on which type of affordance is being operationalised.  
This affordances approach to the legal disruption model suggests that there are at least three 
potential types of disruptive moment that each correspond to the realisation of each type of 
affordance. In such a context, it becomes clear that the technologically-induced legal disruption that 
follows as a consequence of overcoming uninvented affordance obstacles is only the most direct, 
quickest, and readily-perceptible, type. This suggests that additional vigilance is required to identify 
and address those disruptive moments further down the line that arise when unrecognised and 
unexploited types of affordances become operationalised. What this means in terms of the legal 
disruption model is that it appears quite plausible, and indeed quite probable, for the same 
technological innovation to trigger a series of disruptive moments for law, regulation and 
governance. Following this logic, these disruptive moments will involve inflection points for 
change over time, but these will occur in response to different underlying reasons and can therefore 
appear to be unrelated because of spacing in time and effect.  
The Sequential View of Legally Disruptive Moments 
A different way of approaching the relationship between affordances and legal disruption is to 
consider the cascade in a sequential manner. As this is merely another way of organising the ideas 
set out in the preceding section, this will be presented in the abstract to avoid repetition of 
illustrative examples.  
A new techQRlRg\ fiUVW RYeUcRPeV Whe ³uniQYeQWed affRUdaQce´ RbVWacle, WheUeb\ iQWURdXciQg QeZ 
capacities to realise pre-existing desires that were hitherto unachievable. The removal of such 
barriers to implementing desired realities is itself a potential trigger for legal disruption.  
TheQ Whe VecRQd SRWeQWial ZaYe Rf legal diVUXSWiRQ RccXUV ZheQ Whe ³XQUecRgQiVed affRUdaQce´ 
barrier succumbs by people recognising what they can do with a new technology. This sets the 
scene for hypothetical and theoretical legal disruption arising from possible or plausible scenarios. 
At this stage, discussions can be opened up as to what types of legal disruption may arise as a 
consequence of new and emerging technologies in anticipation of their introduction into society. 
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Legal disruption can take place even absent the actual or meaningful introduction of a technology 
into society, insofar as thinking and debating about the mere prospect reveals latent inconsistencies 
or inappropriateness in the existing legal system.  
A WhiUd SRWeQWial ZaYe Rf diVUXSWiRQ Pa\ Wake Slace ZheQ Whe ³XQe[SlRiWed affRUdaQce´ RbVWacle iV 
surmounted as new technologies are actually exploited and applied into society. While this last 
stage provides for evolving real-world situations that can be grappled with from a legal disruption 
perspective, this is also the stage where unintuitive and non-linear impacts occur which are often 
overlooked.  
AI is thus creating new affordances that parlay into new possibilities for behaviour, either by 
complementing and assisting human behaviours, or by automating and displacing them. This creates 
new social problems because our current legal and regulatory frameworks depend centrally on 
human agents as the bearers of rights and duties. We discuss the dynamics of this in more detail 
below when discussing the second stage of our framework.  
Reflections on Disruptive Moments 
In addition to the above, there is a distinction to be drawn between disruption that is intrinsic or 
extrinsic to the legal system. Intrinsic disruption arises when the legal system itself encourages the 
use of a disruptive technology ± in some cases to strengthen the enforcement or functioning of law 
itself (see the discussion below on Displacement) ± in a way that creates problems for the legal 
system down the line. For example, the widespread use of facial recognition technology may 
initially be motivated by a desire to better enforce the existing criminal law, but may then disrupt or 
undermine the existing law due to its second order effects on both human behaviour and other legal 
norms. Extrinsic disruption arises when the technology is used for reasons independent of the law 
and the law must react to its social and legal consequences. For example, the desire to develop and 
use autonomous vehicles is not primarily motivated by the desire to better comply with the highway 
code, but it has consequences for that code (and other areas of law) and so the legal system must 
adapt and respond to its development. 
Two further questions are worth asking about our proposed model of the disruptive moment: (i) 
what makes it disruptive? and (ii) is it really a moment? The answer to both questions is somewhat 
similar. The model idealises and abstracts from the real world, as all good models do. The 
underlying reality maybe fuzzier and more complex than the model presumes. Thus, what makes a 
moment disruptive is never going to be precisely definable. It is always going to be partly 
dependent on both the context and the people affected. In broad outline, we can say a moment is 
µdiVUXSWiYe¶ ZheQ Whe e[iVWiQg VeWV Rf aSSlicable legal QRUPV QR lRQgeU VeeP WR ZRUk (i.e. WheUe aUe 
gaps or omissions or anachronisms that are cast into the light by the new behaviours enabled by the 
affordances of the QeZ WechQRlRgieV). RelaWedl\, WheUe iV XQlikel\ WR be a ViQgle VhaUS µPRPeQW¶ Rf 
disruption. There may be a single moment in time when people realise that the existing legal order 
is no longer fit for purpose, for example this may have happened historically with the advent of 
nuclear weapons. But there may also be an ongoing and iterative process of disruption that only 
become obvious once a certain critical mass of disequilibrium has been reached. The model, as we 
envisage it, embraces both possibilities.  
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Stage Two: Responding to a Disruptive Moment: 
Development, Displacement or Destruction 
The second stage of the model focuses on regulatory responses or reactions to the initial disruptive 
moment. As regulators are made aware of (or begin to perceive) the new affordances created or 
revealed by a given technology, how could they react? How do they react? And what effects can 
these particular reactions have on specific laws, or on legal processes, or on the legal system as a 
whole? As illustrated in Figure 1, legal responses to a disruptive moment can follow three general 
pathways: µDevelopment¶; µDisplacement¶; and µDestruction¶.107 While these pathways are 
illustrated as separate and mutually-exclusive trajectories for the sake of clarity in setting out ideal-
type categories, there is little that prevents fragmented responses to a particular disruptive moment 
to follow some combination of these pathways.108  
 
                                                 
107 This follows and expands further upon a set of categories discussed in MaaV, µIQWeUQaWiRQal LaZ DReV NRW CRPSXWe¶ 
(n 76).  
108 While this is elaborated upon in greater detail below below, to provide just one example here for clarity: drone 
technology may simultaneously: create the need for legal Development to clarify questions of liability, privacy, and no-
fly zones; create opportunities for legal Displacement by strengthening the monitoring and surveillance abilities of 
policing departments; create opportunities for legal Destruction by improving the ability of e.g. gangs to smuggle drugs 
past traditional avenues. How these three trends interact--and the degree to which these developments may amplify or 
cancel out one another--is unclear and complex. 
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Figure 1. Responses to the Disruptive Moment 
Turning to the three primary channels of the framework, a relatively sharp divide can be drawn 
between Legal Development on the one hand, and Displacement or Destruction on the other. This 
division pivots upon whether the disruptive moment signals a recommitment to the dominant 
regulatory paradigm, or whether it precipitates a significant departure from the status ex ante, 
leading to reliance upon other modalities of regulation (Displacement), towards other goals and 
objectives than those sought through the dominant regulatory paradigm, or even towards a decline 
or rupture of (components of) the extant legal framework (Destruction). In other words, 
Development seeks to retain, through rebalance, the core features and aims of the contemporary 
legal order while both Displacement and Destruction seek to achieve regulatory objectives through 
different means and/or pursue different purposes than those sought by law and regulation at present. 
LeW¶V QRZ cRQVideU WhiV iQ PRUe deWail.109 
(a) Legal Development 
Taking Legal Development first, this category of response implies legal actions to address the 
disruptive moment from within the orthodox legal paradigm. Development therefore is an 
incremental response that pushes legal principles and processes towards accommodating, and 
thereby diffusing, the disruptive moment. For instance, Matthijs Maas has recently discussed ways 
in which international law might, in principle, be capable of Legal Development to accommodate 
many types of sociotechnical legal change produced by AI.110 Drawing on the taxonomy developed 
by Lyria Bennett Moses,111 and focusing on the context of international law, Maas discusses four 
types of changes wrought by AI which might spur the need for Legal Development. Specifically, AI 
might create new legal gaps that require entirely new rules; it might lead to legal uncertainty; it 
might lead to existing laws now having a wrong scope of application; or it might lead to 
obsolescence of the existing legal provisions for a range of reasons.112 Finally, the legal system 
might fail to reckon with the disUXSWiYe PRPeQW, UeVXlWiQg iQ a QRPiQal cRQWiQXaWiRQ Rf Whe µdefaXlW¶ 
state of the law, with the risk that underlying issues continue to go unaddressed.  
                                                 
109 Throughout the following sections, we will draw on a host of examples, both actual and speculative, to illustrate the 
argument. These are not meant to be exhaustive, and indeed many other cases or situations could be discussed. 
110 MaaV, µIQWeUQaWiRQal LaZ DReV NRW CRPSXWe¶ (Q 76). 
111 Bennett Moses (n 14) 4±5. 
112 MaaV, µIQWeUQaWiRQal LaZ DReV NRW CRPSXWe¶ (Q 76) 39±55. Compare also however the excellent analysis, by 
Rebecca Crootof, of the ways in which new technology (specifically new weapons in the context of international law) 
fosters legal disruption. Rebecca CURRWRf, µRegXlaWiQg NeZ WeaSRQV TechQRlRg\¶ iQ EUic TalbRW JeQVeQ aQd RRQald TP 
Alcala (eds), The Impact of Emerging Technologies on the Law of Armed Conflict (2019) 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3195980> accessed 15 March 2019. She buckets such legal disruption into five 
caWegRUieV: µSigQificaQWl\ ChaQgiQg HRZ LaZ iV CUeaWed RU UVed¶, µHighlighWiQg E[iVWiQg Legal APbigXiW\¶; 
µIQWURdXciQg NeZ UQceUWaiQW\¶; µUQdeUPiQiQg FRXQdaWiRQal AVVXPSWiRQV¶; µOYeUlaSSiQg CaWegRUieV¶. NRWe, Whe laWWeU 
four of these categories map loosely onto the distinct categories in our analysis of Legal Development, whereas 
µSigQificaQWl\ ChaQgiQg HRZ LRZ iV CUeaWed RU UVed¶ PaSV WR RXU diVcXVViRQ Rf Legal DiVSlacePeQW. We aUgXe RXU 
typology also subsumes (or expands on) previous frameworks, such as that offered by Friedman (n 14) 71. (arguing that 
WechQRlRgical chaQge affecWV laZ ³(1) b\ alWeUiQg Whe cRVW Rf YiRlaWiQg aQd eQfRUciQg e[iVWiQg legal UXleV; (2) b\ alWeUiQg 
the underlying facts that justify legal rules; and (3) by changing the underlying facts implicitly assumed by the law, 
PakiQg e[iVWiQg legal cRQceSWV aQd caWegRUieV RbVRleWe, eYeQ PeaQiQgleVV.´). 
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i. New legal gaps  
In the first place, new AI applications may simply create the need for new sui generis rules to deal 
with the legal lacXQae RSeQed XS (RU UeYealed) b\ Whe WechQRlRg\¶V XVe. ThiV Pa\ be e[SUeVVed in 
the need for new regulation to deal with completely novel situations or forms of conduct enabled by 
this technology, or entirely new classes of technology, which do not seem to fit within any existing 
legal regime. For instance, AI could enable new, ethically challenging or politically or strategically 
destabilizing forms of international conduct.113 To be sure, in many such cases, such as with the 
deployment of fully autonomous weapons,114 these developments might still be seen as capable of 
plausible accommodation within existing frameworks, such as the modular Additional Protocols of 
the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons.115 In other cases, however, the situation is 
sufficiently distinct that they might create the need for entirely new treaty regimes, institutions, or 
other global governance instruments:116 this might be the case, for instance, for facial recognition 
systems that could enable widespread global surveillance,117 or military AI analysis systems capable 
of tracking rival nuclear assets (submarines and mobile launchers) in ways that threaten the stability 
of nuclear deterrence.118 Of course, the question as to whether such envisioned Legal Development 
is subsequently politically viable is an entirely distinct one.119 The key situation here, however, is 
that the existing legal instruments have undergone a legally disruptive moment, recognizing a new 
technology (or its specific usage) to clearly fall out of scope of existing instruments.  
ii. Legal uncertainty 
In the second place, AI applications may create legal uncertainty over how, or even whether, 
existing laws apply to certain new affordances ± forms of conduct, types of entities, or possible 
relationships ± which are created or enabled by their use. As Bennett Moses has argued, technology 
can spark a need for legal rules when there is uncertainty over how to legally classify the new 
entities, behaviour or relationships it enables. This is because: there may be no adequate 
classification rubric that exists; because the new behaviour fits into more than one existing category 
                                                 
113 cf. also Dafoe (n 13). 
114 cf. Nehal and others (n 100). HRZeYeU, fRU a cUiWiTXe Rf Whe fRcXV RQ µaXWRQRP\¶ iQ PaQ\ Rf WheVe debaWeV aV 
currently conceived, see Hin-YaQ LiX, LpRQaUd VaQ RRPSae\ aQd MaWWhijV M MaaV, µEdiWRUial: Be\RQd Killer Robots: 
NeWZRUked AUWificial IQWelligeQce S\VWePV DiVUXSWiQg Whe BaWWlefield?¶ (2019) 10 JRXUQal Rf IQWeUQaWiRQal HXPaQiWaUiaQ 
Legal SWXdieV 77; LiX, µFURP Whe AXWRQRP\ FUaPeZRUk WRZaUdV NeWZRUkV aQd S\VWePV ASSURacheV fRU ³AXWRQRPRXV´ 
WeaSRQV S\VWePV¶ (Q 53); LpRQaUd VaQ RRPSae\, µShifWiQg fURP AXWRQRPRXV WeaSRQV WR MiliWaU\ NeWZRUkV¶ (2019) 
10 Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies 111. 
115 MaaV, µIQQRYaWiRQ-PURRf GRYeUQaQce fRU MiliWaU\ AI?¶ (Q 75). 
116 However, for the contrary argument that many challenges created by AI might well be accommodated within 
existing regimes of international law, see also Kunz and Ó hÉigeartaigh (n 55).   
117 On arguments that favour a ban on such systems, see also LXke SWaUk, µFacial RecRgQiWiRQ IV Whe PlXWRQiXP Rf AI¶ 
(2019) 25 XRDS 50; WRRdURZ HaUW]Rg, µFacial RecRgQiWiRQ IV Whe PeUfecW TRRl fRU OSSUeVViRQ¶ (Medium, 2 August 
2018) <https://medium.com/s/story/facial-recognition-is-the-perfect-tool-for-oppression-bc2a08f0fe66> accessed 23 
April 2019. 
118 cf. Michael C HRURZiW], µWheQ SSeed KillV: LeWhal AXWRQRPRXV WeaSRQ S\VWePV, DeWeUUeQce aQd SWabiliW\¶ (2019) 
42 Journal of Strategic Studies 764; Michael C Horowitz, Paul Scharre and Alexander Velez-Green, µA SWable NXcleaU 
FXWXUe? The IPSacW Rf AXWRQRPRXV S\VWePV aQd AUWificial IQWelligeQce¶ [2019] aUXiY:1912.05291 [cV] 
<http://arxiv.org/abs/1912.05291> accessed 18 December 2019; Avin and Amadae (n 105); Edward Geist and Andrew J 
LRhQ, µHRZ MighW AUWificial IQWelligeQce AffecW Whe RiVk Rf NXcleaU WaU?¶ (RAND 2018) 
<https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE296.html>; Sharikov (n 105).  
119 Critically, if it is not, this situation--where a key problem remains unaddressed because of political gridlock or 
failure--caQ UeVXlW iQ µVRfW legal deVWUXcWiRQ¶, aV diVcXVVed belRZ, XQdeU VecWiRQ (c.ii). 
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and becomes subject to conflicting rules; or because an existing legal category is blurred.120 AI 
systems also combine a number of features that may actively blur existing legal categories.121 For 
instance, it has been suggested that some AI systems, given their autonomy and unpredictability, 
might effectively occupy a liminal position between agent and object,122 blurring key 
categorizations that are at the heart of settling questions of responsibility and liability around AI. 
When a given disruptive moment manifests in legal uncertainty of this type, it usually creates the 
need for the clarification or sharpening of existing rules and their definitions and conditions, 
whether by legislative or judicial action. Once again, the question of whether there is sufficient 
conceptual flexibility that the previous concept can be recovered, or political willingness to carry 
out such Legal Development, is a distinct question. 
iii. Wrong scope  
In the third place, new technologies such as certain AI applications can create problems regarding 
the scope of existing laws, which are suddenly held to be over- or under-inclusive of the new 
affordances or applications associated with the AI system. One example of over-inclusivity might 
be fRXQd iQ Whe SURVSecWiYe caVe fRU achieYiQg fXQcWiRQal µlegal SeUVRQhRRd¶ fRU ceUWaiQ algRUiWhPV, 
by exploiting loopholes or lacunae in existing regulation. Shawn Bayern and others have argued 
that loopholes in existing US company law allows for the incorporation of a limited liability 
company, whose operating agreement places it under the control of an AI system.123 Thomas Burri 
has argued that, if such an entity were established in the EU, the internal market principle of the 
mutual recognition of national legal personality would imply that all other EU member states would 
be forced to recognize the personhood of such an entity.124 Provided they were upheld in court,125 
such ploys would reveal inadequacies or loopholes in the existing state of the law ± gaps which, if 
left unplugged, could be exploited or misused by certain actors.126 Conversely, new AI systems 
cRXld alVR UeYeal Whe µXQdeU-iQclXViYiW\¶ Rf Whe laZ, fRU iQVWaQce: ZheQ e[iVWiQg SUiYac\ UegXlaWiRQ iV 
not held to extend to the production of incriminating DeepFake-generated media; when abuse aimed 
at very human-like social robots provokes widespread societal outrage but is not covered under anti-
                                                 
120 Bennett Moses (n 14). 
121 cf. Jacob Turner, Robot Rules: Regulating Artificial Intelligence (Springer Berlin Heidelberg 2018) 64±80. 
122 Or, in the specific case of military AI, may blur the distinction, in International Humanitarian Law, between 
µZeaSRQ¶ aQd µageQW¶. cf. Hin-YaQ LiX, µCaWegRUi]aWiRQ aQd LegaliW\ Rf AXWRQRPRXV aQd RePRWe WeaSRQV S\VWePV¶ 
(2012) 94 International Review of the Red Cross 627. 
123 ShaZQ Ba\eUQ, µThe IPSlicaWiRQV Rf MRdeUQ BXViQeVV±EQWiW\ LaZ fRU Whe RegXlaWiRQ Rf AXWRQRPRXV S\VWePV¶ 
(2016) 7 EXURSeaQ JRXUQal Rf RiVk RegXlaWiRQ 297; ShaZQ Ba\eUQ aQd RWheUV, µCRPSaQ\ LaZ aQd Autonomous 
S\VWePV: A BlXeSUiQW fRU LaZ\eUV, EQWUeSUeQeXUV, aQd RegXlaWRUV¶ (2017) 9 HaVWiQgV ScieQce aQd TechQRlRg\ LaZ 
Journal 135. 
124 ThRPaV BXUUi, µFUee MRYePeQW Rf AlgRUiWhPV: AUWificiall\ IQWelligeQW PeUVRQV CRQTXeU Whe EXURSeaQ UQiRQ¶V 
IQWeUQal MaUkeW¶ iQ WRRdURZ BaUfield aQd UgR PagallR (edV), Research Handbook on the Law of Artificial Intelligence 
(Edward Elgar 2017) <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3010233> accessed 13 September 2018. 
125 A step of which some are sceptical; see for instance MaWWheZ U ScheUeU, µOf Wild BeaVWV aQd DigiWal AQalRgXeV: 
The Legal SWaWXV Rf AXWRQRPRXV S\VWePV¶ (SRcial ScieQce ReVeaUch NeWZRUk 2018) SSRN SchRlaUl\ PaSeU ID 
3223174 <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3223174> accessed 19 November 2018. 
126 FRU a diVcXVViRQ Rf VRPe Rf Whe challeQgeV aQd cUiPiQal RSSRUWXQiWieV Zhich VXch aQ µalgRUiWhPic eQWiWieV¶ 
construction might introduce, see L\QQ M LRPXcki, µAlgRUiWhPic EQWiWieV¶ [2017] UCLA School of Law, Law-Econ 
Research Paper <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2954173> accessed 19 May 2017. 
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cruelty laws;127 or if new sex robots that simulate non-consensual sex are introduced, and likewise 
held to evade existing standards.128 When technologies create a perceived problem of the scope of 
existing legislation, this creates a need for Legal Development, to extrapolate and reaffirm existing 
lines between legal categories so as to explicitly include or exclude the new behaviour, entities or 
relationships.  
iv. Obsolescence  
Fourthly, AI applications can lead to functional legal obsolescence, where existing law is rendered 
unfit for its originally intended purposes. This can occur for one of three subsidiary reasons: 
because the technology (a) renders once regulated behaviour obsolete; (b) undercuts certain 
justifying assumptions; (c) makes existing laws no longer cost-effective to enforce. 
In the first case, obsolescence might result because (a) formerly common behaviour that was subject 
to regulation has been superseded or rendered obsolete in practice as a result of new technology. To 
be sure, it is not necessarily the case that such laws are entirely without effect. After all, the 
precedent they set out might on occasion still provide the key legal metaphors that shape subsequent 
legal interpretations,129 especially in common law contexts. Nonetheless, these laws are (almost) 
never invoked anymore because the entity or behaviour that was the object of regulation has 
become so rare. Are there clear cases of such legal obsolescence? One might consider the status of 
past µdead leWWeU¶ laZV, VXch aV UXleV RQ Whe PaQagePeQW Rf WelegUaSh iQfUaVWUXcWXUe.130 More 
speculatively, in the context of international law, one might consider an extreme extrapolation of 
the current military trend towaUdV µUePRWe ZaUfaUe¶; if AI-steered combat platforms come to widely 
replace human soldiers on the battlespace, this might marginalise or render functionally moot 
certain principles of IHL dictating the treatment of prisoners of war.131 On reflection, this category 
of legal obsolescence may be relatively rare because, while technological progress creates new 
affordances, it less often results in the wholesale disappearance of certain types of behaviour.132 In 
the second place, one can debate to what extent this first type of legal obsolescence truly poses a 
SURbleP fRU Whe legal V\VWeP. While iQ VRPe caVeV, aQWiTXaWed aQd YiUWXall\ XQiQYRked µdead leWWeU¶ 
                                                 
127 cf. KaWe DaUliQg, µE[WeQdiQg Legal RighWV WR SRcial RRbRWV: The Effects of Anthropomorphism, Empathy, and 
ViRleQW BehaYiRU TRZaUdV RRbRWic ObjecWV¶ [2012] SSRN ElecWURQic JRXUQal <hWWS://URbRWV.laZ.PiaPi.edX/ZS-
content/uploads/2012/04/Darling_Extending-Legal-Rights-to-Social-Robots-v2.pdf> accessed 7 January 2019. 
128 See generally JRhQ DaQaheU, µRRbRWic RaSe aQd RRbRWic Child Se[Xal AbXVe: ShRXld The\ Be CUiPiQaliVed?¶ 
(2017) 11 Criminal Law and Philosophy 71. AQd fRU SURSRVal aQd diVcXVViRQ aURXQd a SUeVXPed µcRQVeQW PRdXle¶, Vee 
AQcR PeeWeUV aQd PiP HaVelageU, µDeVigQiQg ViUWXRXV Se[ RRbRWV¶ [2019] IQWeUQaWiRQal JRXUQal Rf SRcial RRbRWicV 
<https://www.readcube.com/articles/10.1007/s12369-019-00592-1> accessed 8 October 2019. 
129 For a discussion of this in the context of AI, see R\aQ CalR, µRRbRWV aV Legal MeWaShRUV¶ (2016) 30 HaUYaUd JRXUQal 
Rf LaZ aQd TechQRlRg\ 209; See geQeUall\ GUegRU\ N MaQdel, µLegal EYRlXWiRQ iQ ReVSRQVe WR TechQRlRgical ChaQge¶ 
[2017] The Oxford Handbook of Law, Regulation and Technology 233±234 
<http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199680832.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199680832-e-
45> accessed 26 September 2018. 
130 On the other hand, at least within the common law system, cases dealing with telegraphs or other outmoded forms of 
communication may nonetheless have continued relevance. In such cases, these laws might be only partially 
obsolescent. 
131 cf. MaaV, µIQWeUQaWiRQal LaZ DReV NRW CRPSXWe¶ (Q 76) 42. 
132 Of couUVe, iW iV alVR aQ RSeQ TXeVWiRQ ZheWheU VXch µdead leWWeU¶ RbVRleVceQce WUXl\ UeTXiUeV caWegRUical ceVVaWiRQ RU 
RbVRleVceQce Rf ceUWaiQ behaYiRXU, RU ZheWheU µYiUWXal¶ diVaSSeaUaQce VXfficeV. 
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laws do rear their head,133 in most cases the legal disruption imposed on a legal system by having 
µVXSeUflXRXV bXW XQiQYRked¶ laZV VeePV SURblePaWic, if aW all, RQl\ fURP a legal cRheUeQWiVW 
perspective.134 This type of legal obsolescence, however, can still pose problems for the law (even 
from a regulatory instrumentalist perspective) if obsolete statutes provide (misleading) judicial 
PeWaShRUV; RU if Whe\ gURZ iQWR µjXUiVSUXdeQWial VSace jXQk¶ WhaW PXddies the waters.135  
Secondly, and more problematically for the law, legal obsolescence can also occur because (b) one 
or more basic justifying assumptions that underlie the original historical introduction and specific 
formulation of a particular law are no longer valid. For example, one might argue that the 
(admittedly aspirational) human right to work, as enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, is premised on the 
assumption that societies will continue to need (and be capable of providing) employment for a 
large fraction of their population. As AI systems continue to outstrip human performance in more 
domains,136 and as a large population is rendered structurally unemployable, this change may render 
this right to work functionally obsolete, with repercussions to the large parts of the global legal 
regime constructed by the International Labour Organization,137 creating the need for legal 
development that assures and secures new, different notions of human meaning and productivity in 
a post-work era.138  
Finally, legal obsolescence (and the accordant need for legal development) can occur (c) because a 
law is no longer cost-effective to enforce. For instance, scholars have raised the possibility that 
µDeeSFakeV¶ PighW adYeUVel\ affecW Whe eSiVWePRlRgical fRXQdaWiRQV Rf bRWh dRPeVWic cRXUWV and 
also international human rights investigations.139 Practical difficulties introduced by new 
technologies can often slow the enforcement of older legal frameworks to new spaces: the difficulty 
of attributing attacks in cyberspace has been held as one (if not the only) hurdle to effectively 
regulating cyberattacks.140 In some cases, Legal Development can seek to address this variant of 
obsolescence by simply seeking to restrict the innovation that undercuts the cost-effectiveness of 
enforcement.141 In other cases, however, the technology has many additional legitimate uses, or has 
already been sufficiently integrated in the economic and social fabric, that banning it wholesale, 
                                                 
133 cf. in the context of blasphemous libel, JeUeP\ PaWUick, µNRW Dead, JXVW SleeSiQg: CaQada¶V PURhibiWiRQ RQ 
Blasphemous Libel as a Case Study in Obsolete LegislaWiRQ¶ (2008) 41 U.B.C. LaZ ReYieZ 193. 
134 cf. the discussion in GUahaP McBaiQ, µAbRliVhiQg SRPe ObVRleWe CRPPRQ LaZ CUiPeV¶ (2009) 20 KiQg¶V LaZ 
Journal 89. 
135 CURRWRf, µJXUiVSUXdeQWial SSace JXQk¶ (Q 76). 
136 KaWja GUace aQd RWheUV, µWheQ Will AI E[ceed HXPaQ PeUfRUPaQce? EYideQce fURP AI E[SeUWV¶ (2018) 62 JRXUQal 
of Artificial Intelligence Research 729. 
137 MaaV, µIQWeUQaWiRQal LaZ DReV NRW CRPSXWe¶ (Q 76) 43. 
138 See for example John Danaher, Automation and Utopia: Human Flourishing in a World without Work (Harvard 
University Press 2019). 
139 SWeYeQ LiYiQgVWRQ aQd MaWhiaV RiVVe, µThe FXWXUe IPSacW Rf AUWificial IQWelligeQce RQ HXPaQV aQd HXPaQ RighWV¶ 
(2019) 33 Ethics & International Affairs 141, 144. 
140 Michael J GleQQRQ, µThe DaUk FXWXUe Rf IQWeUQaWiRQal C\beUVecXUiW\ RegXlaWiRQ¶ (2013) 6 JRXUQal Rf NaWiRQal 
Security Law & Policy 563. 
141 CRQVideU Whe N.Y.P.D.¶V 2019 aSSeal WR GRRgle, dePaQdiQg WhaW Whe cRPSaQ\ UePRYe Whe locations of police drunk-
driving checkpoints from its Waze navigation app. Michael GRld, µGRRgle aQd Wa]e MXVW SWRS ShaUiQg DUXQkeQ-
DUiYiQg CheckSRiQWV, NeZ YRUk PRlice DePaQd¶ The New York Times (6 February 2019) 
<https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/06/nyregion/waze-nypd-location.html> accessed 4 December 2019. 
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simply because certain uses of it undercut the enforcement of certain laws, is not tenable.142 In such 
cases, regulation might seek not to restrict, but rather to channel the processes of innovation or of its 
deployment, to ensure that they proceed along pathways that ensure the innovation is still 
susceptible to cost-effective regulation and enforcement.143 In the cases of AI in particular, where 
distinct techniques have such immensely broad applications, we may therefore expect that legal 
development in response to obsolescence will not often take the form of reactive bans or restrictions 
to the circumventing technology (effectively an attempt to reaffirm the status ex ante). Rather, 
Legal Development strategies will pursue the implementation of new, substitute vectors of 
UegXlaWiRQ: iQ VRPe caVeV iQ Whe fRUP Rf QeZ, diffeUeQWl\ VSecified UegXlaWiRQ; iQ RWheU caVeV µcRded 
iQ¶ diUecWl\ WhURXgh Whe use of new technology.144  
In summary, where a technology drives legal obsolescence, the disruptive moment can spark a drive 
towards Legal Development, as it creates a realisation (or perception) amongst lawmakers that (a) 
ceUWaiQ e[iVWiQg laZV aUe QRZ µdead leWWeU laZV¶ Zhich caQ be VWUXck fURP Whe bRRkV ZiWhRXW PXch 
consequence; (b) that the law is no longer serving its original, intended purpose because one of its 
key assumptions having changed such that it may need replacement by another law; or (c) certain 
laws need a reformulation, in a way that is more cost-effective (or possible) to enforce. 
While the above discussion of Legal Development ± to respond to the creation of new legal gaps, 
legal uncertainty, wrong scope, or legal obsolescence ± draws on examples that are specific to AI, 
this tracks the ways other technologies have challenged law, and shows how extant tools and 
sources of law might accommodate these disruptive changes in principle. For instance: legislative 
action or judicial review can both develop existing law or create new bodies of law (if not always in 
time) to cover the completely new applications; clarify the status or definition of concepts, 
jurisdiction, or the applicability of laws to a technology; close loopholes; repeal now-unnecessary 
laws, or substitute new regulation for now-unjustifiable or unenforceable laws. 
v. Default and Other Feedback Dynamics 
IW iV iPSRUWaQW WR UecRgQi]e, hRZeYeU, WhaW eYeQ if Whe XVe Rf a QeZ WechQRlRg\ cUeaWeV a µdiVUXSWiYe 
PRPeQW¶, WhiV dReV QRW Pean that Legal Development is bound to follow, let alone succeed. In the 
µdefaXlW¶ VceQaUiR, Whe iPSeWXV WRZaUdV Legal DeYelRSPeQW failV aQd Whe legal V\VWeP UePaiQV iQ iWV 
                                                 
142 In a sense, this could be understood as a version of the well-eVWabliVhed µCRlliQgUidge DilePPa¶: "The URRW Rf Whe 
manifest difficulties with which the control of technology are beset is that our technical competence vastly exceeds our 
understanding of the social effects which follow from its exercise. For this reason, the social consequences of a 
technology cannot be predicted early in the life of a technology. By the time undesirable consequences are discovered, 
however, the technology is often so much part of the whole economic and social fabric that its control is extremely 
difficult." David Collingridge, The Social Control of Technology (Palgrave Macmillan 1981) 11. 
143 For instance, Lessig notes how, when the transition to digital telephone networks rendered traditional governmental 
wiretapping difficult (i.e. less cost-effective), the US government responded by passing regulation that simply required 
telephone companies to select network architectures that facilitated wiretapping. LeVVig, µThe LaZ Rf Whe HRUVe¶ (Q 37) 
531. Likewise, when faced with computer piracy of intellectual property, the response was not to ban internet 
communications (or computers) entirely, but instead to harness the possibilities of the new technology itself--the 
aUchiWecWXUal SRVVibiliWieV Rf µcRde¶--to constitute neZ UegXlaWRU\ fUaPeZRUkV WhaW UeQdeUed VXch cUiPeV µiPSRVVible¶. 
ibid 523±528. 
144 CRPSaUe, fRU iQVWaQce, YRXWXbe¶V CRQWeQW ID algRUiWhP, Zhich aXWRPaWicall\ SURceVVeV cRS\UighW cRQWURl caVeV RQ 
the video sharing platform. LeURQ SRlRPRQ, µFaiU UVeUV RU CRQWeQW AbXVeUV: The AXWomatic Flagging of Non-Infringing 
VideRV b\ CRQWeQW ID RQ YRXWXbe NRWe¶ (2015) 44 HRfVWUa LaZ ReYieZ [i]. See also the discussion on Displacement, in 
the next section. 
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pre-existing status quo. The continuation of the default state can come about for a range of reasons 
including neglect, lobbying, or deadlock. This needs to be distinguished from the persistence of a 
default state where a disruptive moment has been erroneously identified. In other words, the default 
state can also persist in situations where there is actually no legally disruptive moment arising from 
a given application of a new technology. Lyria Bennett Moses, for instance, once argued that  
³WUaffic UXleV cRQWiQXe WR aSSl\ WR caUV ZiWh elecWUic ZiQdRZV, aQd QR VaQe SeUVRQ ZRXld Veek to 
challeQge WheVe laZV aV iQaSSlicable RU ZUiWe aQ aUWicle calliQg fRU Whe laZ WR be claUified.´145 In 
practice many technological developments that in retrospect turn out modest, may initially be 
treated as comprehensively disruptive.146 
While we discuss WhiV belRZ, iW VhRXld be QRWed WhaW a UegUeVViRQ WR µdefaXlW¶ caQ alVR RccXU iQ Whe 
aftermath of Legal Displacement,147 whereby decisions to enforce extant normative law shift the 
problem-portfolio beyond the realm of law, thereby leaving the principles and processes at the legal 
level unchanged. If we are dealing with a genuinely disruptive technology (as opposed to one that is 
merely anticipated or imagined) the likelihood is that the continuation of the default regulatory 
response will increase the tensions between the system and reality, triggering subsequent disruptive 
moments, or feeding directly into soft legal destruction (erosion),148 as elements of the law are 
UeYealed aV iQadeTXaWe aW UeVSRQdiQg WR Whe WechQRlRg\¶V challeQge. ThiV VXggeVWV WhaW UegUeVsion to 
default is neither a likely resting nor terminal state for the legal disruption framework, when the 
disruption does not exist purely in the imagination.  
Furthermore, there are clear feedback cycles of development in relation to the disruptive moment. 
Development is clearly an important response to the disruptive moment. Yet, developmental 
responses may become divergent and subsequently fragment in the sense that domain-specific 
developments proceed along trajectories that are not coordinated or harmonised.149 The coherence 
of the legal system then becomes diluted, undermining the robustness and resilience of the legal 
order to confront subsequent disruptive moments. Furthermore, the resulting instability may then 
channel responses to later disruptive moments towards Displacement and Destruction, decreasing 
the relevance of the law itself. Development may also have more directly counterproductive effects 
that feed back into disruption because attempts to accommodate the disruptive moment may open 
up latent inconsistencies in legal doctrine. Common questions of responsibility and liability relating 
to AI agents arising from their liminal position between agent and object, for example, could 
boomerang and force re-evaluations of what these legal concepts entail in relation to human beings. 
Insofar as foundational legal doctrines are excavated, this can render the legal order more 
susceptible to other disruptive moments arising from other sectors.  
Finally, because Legal Development as a response does not seek to radically alter or reconceive the 
legal order, its focus on the level of the law directs efforts towards reinforcing the legal order. 
While this introspective orientation may be necessary, it may detract from simultaneous 
Displacement and Destruction processes at play. In other words, while the legal order is being 
shored up against the shock of a disruptive moment, both its reach and relevance have diminished 
                                                 
145 Bennett Moses (n 50) 596. 
146 These points will be explored mRUe iQ VecWiRQ 3.4 RQ µA UVeU-GXide WR Whe Legal DiVUXSWiRQ MRdel¶.  
147 As discussed in more detail in the next section. 
148 AV diVcXVVed iQ VecWiRQ 2(c)(i), RQ µeURViRQ¶. 
149 As discussed above, under section 1. 
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because the disruptive moment has set into motion responses that displace the law and initiated 
steps to depart from the rationale underpinning the law. The warning here is not only that it is quite 
possible to win the legal battle, but lose the regulatory war: it is also possible to appear victorious 
without realising the Pyrrhic nature of that victory. 
(b) Legal Displacement 
In the Legal Displacement response category, the problem encapsulated in the disruptive moment is 
not that new technological innovations create affordances that challenge the substance of existing 
law (as under Legal Development), but rather that they create new affordances for the regulators 
producing and enforcing the law. Accordingly, while it may appear as a less orthodox case, legal 
displacement too can be captured under the three-stage model of legal disruption as a result of new 
affordances. That is, new technologies (especially AI) have a plethora of applications in policing, 
administration, judicial decision-making, and the business of government writ large. In doing so 
they may open up the possibility of achieving certain regulatory results without relying as much on 
the traditional institutional machinery of the law.  
The introduction of new technology challenges existing practices of law because it creates new 
procedural or instrumental opportunities for legal actors.150 This is often, but not always, the result 
Rf aQ iQWUiQVic diVUXSWiYe PRPeQW aQd Pa\ iQiWiall\ cRPSlePeQW, bXW gUadXall\ µdiVSlace¶ (UaWheU 
than substantively challenge) certain existing laws in a functional manner. There are two 
subcategories of Legal Displacement by AI. First, legal automation draws on the use of AI in the 
SURdXcWiRQ, adjXdicaWiRQ RU eQfRUcePeQW Rf µQRUPaWiYe¶ laZ. SecRQdl\, legal replacement involves 
the use of AI to shift the configuration of regulatory modalities in which a legal system is 
ePbedded. ThiV eQableV Whe SURgUeVViYe µQXdgiQg¶ RU eYeQ fXll-scale non-QRUPaWiYe µWechQRlRgical 
PaQagePeQW¶ Rf UegXlaWee behaYiRXU.151 
i. Automation  
AI systems can be used to automate a range of routine legal tasks. Drawing on adequate databases, 
machine learning systems can even learn to predict the outcomes of legal disputes, such as judicial 
decisions of the European Court of Human Rights.152 There are many extensive and valid critiques 
of the prospects for legal automation given the limits of the current generation of machine learning 
approaches,153 as well as critiques identifying the particular pitfalls of overtrust and interface design 
                                                 
150 Which, of course, can in turn lead to new disruptive moments that result in Legal Development--as in the case of the 
famous State v. Loomis case, where the use of the COMPAS algorithm in assessing risk of recidivism, sparked debate 
over the admissibility of judges relying on such opaque systems. µSWaWe Y. LRRPiV: WiVcRQViQ SXSUePe CRXUW ReTXiUeV 
WaUQiQg BefRUe UVe Rf AlgRUiWhPic RiVk AVVeVVPeQWV iQ SeQWeQciQg.¶ (2017) 130 HaUYaUd LaZ ReYieZ 1530. 
151 This section draws on, and extends the discussion in MaaV, µIQWeUQaWiRQal LaZ DReV NRW CRPSXWe¶ (Q 76) 44±50. 
152 NikRlaRV AleWUaV aQd RWheUV, µPUedicWiQg JXdicial Decisions of the European Court of Human Rights: A Natural 
LaQgXage PURceVViQg PeUVSecWiYe¶ (2016) 2 PeeUJ CRPSXWeU ScieQce e93; MaVha MedYedeYa, Michel VRlV aQd MaUWijQ 
WieliQg, µJXdicial DeciViRQV Rf Whe EXURSeaQ CRXUW Rf HXPaQ RighWV: LRRkiQg IQWR Whe CU\VWal Ball¶ 24.  
153 See for instance: FUaQk PaVTXale aQd Gl\Q CaVhZell, µFRXU FXWXUeV Rf Legal AXWRPaWiRQ¶ (2015) 26 UCLA LaZ 
ReYieZ DiVcRXUVe 23; FUaQk A PaVTXale, µA RXle Rf PeUVRQV, NRW MachiQeV: The LiPiWV Rf Legal AXWRPaWiRQ¶ (2019) 
87 GeRUge WaVhiQgWRQ LaZ ReYieZ 1; MiUeille HildebUaQdW, µLaZ AV CRPSXWaWiRQ iQ Whe EUa Rf AUWificial Legal 
IntelligeQce. SSeakiQg LaZ WR Whe PRZeU Rf SWaWiVWicV¶ (SRcial ScieQce ReVeaUch NeWZRUk 2017) SSRN SchRlaUl\ PaSeU 
ID 2983045 <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2983045> accessed 9 July 2018. 
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eUURUV WhaW SlagXe h\bUid hXPaQ aQd AI µc\bRUg jXVWice¶ aUUaQgePeQWV.154 Others have cautioned 
that the automation of law enforcement systems might close the loop on inefficiency and 
indeterminacy, which are important safeguards against the perfect enforcement of laws that were 
drafted with an implicit assumption of lenience.155 Nonetheless, barring a major backlash,156 it 
seems likely that many of these technologies will see continued development and deployment, 
VXSSRUWiQg a geQeUal VhifW WRZaUdV µWechQRcUaWic¶ UegXlaWRU\ aWWiWXdeV.157 
The use of technologies in support of existing legal structures and processes, offers the first face of 
a (intrinsic) disruptive moment resulting in Legal Displacement. This could take the form of the 
automated monitoring of citizen compliance with existing legal norms. For example, a police force 
could use automated speed cameras, facial recognition technology and automated identity-tracking 
to locate people who have breached road traffic laws. Punishment could also be automated through 
something akin to the social credit system, such as the set of systems that have reportedly been 
undergoing trials in China.158 As technology advances, Legal Displacement by AI could even 
extend beyond the prediction or adjudication of legal questions, moving instead towards the 
production of new normative laws (which can then be automatically monitored and enforced). This 
would be the case in the hypothetical case of a µlegal ViQgXlaUiW\¶, which envisions a system that can 
predict the outcome of legal cases based on their details. Such a system would be capable of 
WailRUiQg µPicUR-diUecWiYeV¶ to each situation and each regulatee, collapsing the traditional 
distinction between legal rules and standards.159 This could have far-reaching implications for how 
we conceptualize the essential features of legality.160 Even such legal automation, however, still 
                                                 
154 Rebecca CURRWRf, µ³C\bRUg JXVWice´ aQd Whe RiVk Rf TechQRlRgical-Legal Lock-IQ¶ [2019] CRlXPbia LaZ ReYieZ 
Forum <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3464724> accessed 18 November 2019. 
155 WRRdURZ HaUW]Rg aQd RWheUV, µIQefficieQWl\ AXWRPaWed LaZ EQfRUcePeQW¶ (2016) 2015 MichigaQ SWaWe LaZ 
Review 1763. 
156 A Ueal SRVVibiliW\, WR be VXUe. ReceQW \eaUV haYe VeeQ a µWechlaVh¶ WR Whe cRQdXcW Rf digiWal WechQRlRg\ cRPSaQieV iQ a 
range of sectors. cf. MaUk ScRWW, µIQ 2019, Whe ³TechlaVh´ Will GR fURP SWUeQgWh WR SWUeQgWh¶ (POLITICO, 30 
December 2018) <https://www.politico.eu/article/tech-predictions-2019-facebook-techclash-europe-united-states-data-
misinformation-fake-news/> accessed 9 December 2019. Likewise, cities such as San Francisco have begun to ban 
sidewalk delivery robots (2017) and facial recognition (2019); see Matt Simon, µSaQ FUaQciVcR JXVW PXW Whe BUakeV RQ 
DeliYeU\ RRbRWV¶ [2017] Wired <https://www.wired.com/story/san-francisco-just-put-the-brakes-on-delivery-robots/> 
acceVVed 9 DecePbeU 2019; KaWe CRQgeU, RichaUd FaXVVeW aQd SeUge F KRYaleVki, µSaQ FUaQciVcR BaQV Facial 
RecRgQiWiRQ TechQRlRg\¶ The New York Times (14 May 2019) <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/14/us/facial-
recognition-ban-san-francisco.html> accessed 28 June 2019. Some have even suggested that, if mishandled, AI 
technology may experience a similar backlash and subsequent strict regulatory response as GMO crops in the EU. Cf. 
AQdUeZ GURWWR, µGeQeWicall\ MRdified OUgaQiVPV: A PUecaXWiRQaU\ Tale FRU AI GRYeUQaQce¶ [2019] AI PXlVe 
<https://aipulse.org/genetically-modified-organisms-a-precautionary-tale-for-ai-governance-2/> accessed 26 February 
2019. 
157 cf. BURZQVZRUd, µLaZ DiVUXSWed, LaZ Re-Imagined, Law Re-IQYeQWed¶ (Q 39). 
158 RRgieU CUeePeUV, µChiQa¶V SRcial CUediW S\VWeP: AQ EYRlYiQg PUacWice Rf CRQWURl¶ (SRcial ScieQce ReVeaUch 
Network 2018) SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 3175792 <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3175792> accessed 16 May 2018. 
159 BeQjaPiQ AlaUie, µThe PaWh Rf Whe LaZ: TRZaUdV Legal SiQgXlaUiW\¶ (2016) 66 UQiYeUViW\ Rf TRURQWR LaZ JRXUQal 
443; BeQjaPiQ AlaUie, AQWhRQ\ NibleWW aQd AlbeUW H YRRQ, µLaZ iQ Whe FXWXUe¶ [2016] UQiYeUViWy of Toronto Law 
Journal <https://www.utpjournals.press/doi/abs/10.3138/UTLJ.4005> accessed 28 January 2019; Anthony J Casey and 
AQWhRQ\ NibleWW, µSelf-DUiYiQg LaZV¶ (2016) 66 UQiYeUViW\ Rf TRURQWR LaZ JRXUQal 429; AQWhRQ\ J CaVe\ aQd AQWhRQ\ 
NibleWW, µThe DeaWh Rf RXleV aQd SWaQdaUdV¶ (2017) 92 IQdiaQa LaZ JRXUQal 1401. 
160 See the discussion by Brian Sheppard, on how machine learning systems in legislation and adjudication, and 
specifically the tradeoffs they may force between intelligibility and results, may lead us to reject concepts of legality 
that require critical officials (Hart), reason-based tests of legitimacy (Raz), or justification for coercion (Dworkin).  
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constitutes only an incomplete or soft form of Legal Displacement, since it involves the continued 
existence (and indeed, the expected cybernetic strengthening) of a legal-normative order.  
ii. Replacement 
More fundamentally, AI could facilitate or drive a VhifW WRZaUdV QRYel µPRdeV¶ Rf achieYiQg 
societally desired regulatory outcomes, which no longer rely on explicitly articulated normative 
laws at all. IW iV helSfXl WR WhiQk Rf WhiV iQ WeUPV Rf LeVVig¶V Uegulatory modalities of law, social 
norms, markets, and architecture.161 Although lawyers may think it natural to assume the best 
response to AI-driven legal disruption is to develop and reform the legal system, this may not 
always be possible or desirable. But if the legal modality of regulation falls short or fails to pull its 
ZeighW, Whe UegXlaWRU\ RXWcRPe deUiYed fURP Whe VXP WRWal cRQfigXUaWiRQ (RU µPi[¶) Rf UegXlaWRU\ 
modalities will be affected. If Legal Development is slow and unwieldy, and if the technology is 
truly disruptive, other regulatory modalities such as the architecture modality of regulation, may be 
called upon to take up the slack and address the challenge. This can happen intentionally, where 
there is a concerted effort to reconfigure the constellation of regulatory modalities to make up for 
the legal shortfall, but more problematically this can occur also through uncoordinated responses. 
While both scenarios represent legal displacement, those that arise through the latter path are less 
perceptible and more difficult to subsequently overturn. 
In addition to this, AI systems themselves may open up new possible modes of regulation. Among 
LeVVig¶V UegXlaWRU\ PRdaliWieV, AI WaSV PRVW Ueadil\ iQWR Whe PaUkeW aQd aUchiWecWXUe RU cRde 
alternatives (converging with technological management162) to the law. Thus, prominent examples 
of Legal Displacement may involve regulators deploying market or architectural modalities where 
once they appealed to legal mechanisms to pursue their objectives. The resulting systems of AI-
PediaWed µWechQRlRgical PaQagePeQW¶ (RU leVV dUaPaWicall\, QXdge chRice aUchiWecWXUeV) Rf hXPaQ 
behaYiRXU ZRXld be µnon-QRUPaWiYe¶, ViQce Whe\ QR lRQgeU e[SliciWl\ iQYRke RU aSSeal WR a legal 
norm with which the regulatee should align their behaviour (or face penalties). Rather, the use of 
such AI systems might simply present a technologically-shaped environment which renders certain 
choice options impossible ± or at least imperceptible. This raises the spectre of AI systems being 
deployed iQ SURjecWV WR µh\SeUQXdge¶163 ciWi]eQV, SRWeQWiall\ bXildiQg WRZaUdV aQ µalgRcUac\¶.164 
In sum, Legal Displacement is one possible outcome of legal disruption. Here the law is disrupted, 
not by extrinsic technology-enabled affordances that challenge its substance or doctrine (as under 
Legal Development). Rather, the technology in question creates new affordances for governments, 
hence the disruptive moment here is often intrinsic to the regulator. In some cases, this may 
nominally strengthen the efficacy of legal systems, but in others it may lead to the iterative 
replacement of those very legal systems. In return, the use of technology in the service of Legal 
Displacement often generates strong feedback effects that feed into new legal disruptive moments. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
BUiaQ SheSSaUd, µWaUPiQg XS WR IQVcUXWabiliW\: HRZ TechQRlRg\ CRXld ChalleQge OXU CRQceSW Rf LaZ¶ (2018) 68 
University of Toronto Law Journal 36. 
161 LeVVig, µThe NeZ ChicagR SchRRl¶ (Q 37); LeVVig, µThe LaZ Rf Whe HRUVe¶ (Q 37). 
162 RRgeU BURZQVZRUd, µTechQRlRgical MaQagePeQW aQd Whe RXle Rf LaZ¶ (2016) 8 LaZ, IQQRYaWiRQ aQd TechQRlRg\ 
100. 
163 KaUeQ YeXQg, µ³H\SeUQXdge´: Big DaWa aV a MRde Rf RegXlaWiRQ b\ DeVigQ¶ (2017) 20 IQfRUPaWiRQ, 
Communication & Society 118. 
164 DaQaheU, µThe ThUeaW Rf AlgRcUac\¶ (Q 98). 
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This happens once regulatees (and in some cases, other branches of government) become cognizant 
of, and challenge, the legality of these new tools. Just as the introduction of phone wiretapping, 
fingerprint analysis and DNA tests not only directly changed the processes of the law and its 
evidence requirements, but also led to indirect new Legal Developments,165 the use of AI systems in 
facial recognition, drone surveillance platforms, predictive policing, and judicial decision-making 
are already generating new disruptive moments as societies and lawmakers begin to identify them 
as sites for the constitution of new Legal Developments. 
(c) Legal Destruction 
Legal Destruction constitutes the final pathway of the legal disruption model and is deeply tied up 
with the practical foundations and limits of legal systems. Under this category, the response to a 
disruptive moment ends in the sustained failure of regulatory initiatives. This can occur in the face 
of intractable practical or political hurdles involved in the regulation of the new technology, 
rendering legal development impossible or impracticable. Alternatively, Legal Destruction can take 
place as a result of a decline in the underlying conditions that support the legal order. Legal 
Destruction, insofar as it challenges the status quo of the existing legal system, is therefore most 
often the result of an extrinsic disruptive moment, but in residual instances can also arise from an 
intrinsic one with unanticipated results. It can be subdivided into soft and hard versions: µeURViRQ¶ 
aQd µdecliQe¶.  
i. Erosion  
Our earlier treatment of Legal Development covered different ways in which AI technology could 
give rise to new affordances (new entities, relationships, or especially behaviours) across different 
domains. This can result in disruptive moments resulting in regulators changing, clarifying or 
updating the legal system to adapt it to these challenges (Legal Development). This, however, raises 
a practical question: to what extent can such Legal Developments be carried out? What are the 
constraints on these initiatives? And what are the results if no avenue of legal development is 
sufficiently effective? Or politically viable?  
ThiV \ieldV Whe fiUVW YeUViRQ Rf Legal DeVWUXcWiRQ: a µVRfW eURViRQ¶ Rf VSecific e[iVting legal 
frameworks, because the particular affordances created by the use of AI have certain features, 
which render effective legal development practically or politically difficult if not impossible. They 
becRPe µXQVRlYable SX]]leV¶ fRU laZ b\ cUeaWiQg situations where the need for legal adaptation is 
clear ± a disruptive moment is sparked ± but regulators are unable to carry through (meaningfully 
effective) changes to legislation in response. 
Why does this challenge occur? Is it a plausible risk? In principle, a legal system ought to be 
capable of being reconfigured to accommodate nearly any external challenge that can be 
meaningfully captured within human natural language. Given complete freedom to alter or redefine 
disrupted doctrinal categories, it seems that there would be few technology-driven legal challenges 
that could not, in principle, be resolved by Legal Development. For example, problems over the 
liPiQal VWaWXV Rf AI V\VWePV beWZeeQ µageQWV¶ aQd µRbjecWV¶, RU RYeU WheiU XQSUedicWabiliW\, cRXld be 
                                                 
165 Mandel (n 129). 
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defined away by introducing wholly novel legal categories, principles or standards. Such a solution 
would be compatible with a regulatory-instrumentalist perspective, if not a legal-coherentist one.166 
In practice, however, matters are obviously more constrained. New legislation or case law that 
seeks to grapple with new technology is often to a large degree path-dependent: it is constrained by 
precedent; by its reliance on legal metaphors that invoke past cases;167 and by the practical need to 
accord with a ceUWaiQ degUee Rf eVWabliVhed µfRlk XQdeUVWaQdiQg¶.168 These factors conceptually limit 
which avenues of Legal Development regulators are able, seek, or even consider, to pursue in 
response to a new disruptive moment.  
In addition to these conceptual limits, however, certain technologies can prove recalcitrant to Legal 
Development for political reasons. For instance, they might create a range of affordances that 
empower some stakeholders much more than others. Or alternatively, their future trajectory and 
implications might be very unclear, inhibiting the UegXlaWRU¶V articulation of a disruptive moment 
and resultant effective regulatory action at an early stage, until the technology has already become 
firmly embedded at a later stage, and many parties have established stakes, and it is hard to 
dislodge.169 The technology might map onto open political fault-lines; or simply be easily 
disseminated. As Lessig noted in the context of cyberspace, some designs of cyberspace made on-
liQe behaYiRXU PRUe µUegXlaWable¶, whereas others made it less so.170  
While these problems can sometimes be manageable on the domestic level,171 regulatory resistance 
can become a particularly acute problem in the global arena, where some weapons technologies, it 
haV beeQ aUgXed, aUe PRUe µUegulation-UeViVWaQW¶ WhaQ RWheUV.172 For instance, take cyber-weapons: in 
spite of calls for global regulation of cyberwar,173 it has been argued that traditional arms control 
regimes are unlikely to be successfully transferred to the realm of cyberspace, because of the 
diffeUeQceV iQ hRZ Whe µZeaSRQV¶ iQ TXeVWiRQ aUe XVed (VSecificall\ Whe difficXlW\ Rf aWWUibXWiRQ), aQd 
the relative difficulty of monitoring compliance.174 In such cases, the reason that there are no global 
cyberwarfare conventions is not that no problem is perceived to exist (a lack of a disruptive 
                                                 
166 That is, it would be incompatible with a legal-coherentist approach that emphasises the coherence of new legislation 
with extant legislation. Alternatively, one could consider a complete paradigm shifts within the orientation and 
conceptual underpinnings of a legal system, that would functionally resolve all the conceptual unclarities as well as 
SUacWical challeQgeV SRVed b\ a QeZ WechQRlRg\. ThiV ZRXld be aQ e[WUePe legal µShaVe WUaQViWiRQ¶, iQ Whe V\VWePV-
theory based framework explored by Ruhl: RXhl (Q 56); JB RXhl, µMaQagiQg S\VWePic RiVk iQ Legal S\VWePV¶ (2014) 
89 Indiana Law Journal 559. In such a case, legal coherentists might accept the new legal equilibrium so long as it were 
self-consistent.  
167 See CalR, µRRbRWV aV Legal MeWaShRUV¶ (Q 129); MaQdel (Q 129). 
168 PieUUe Schlag, µSSaP JXUiVSUXdeQce, AiU LaZ, aQd Whe RaQk AQ[ieW\ Rf NRWhiQg HaSSeQiQg (A ReSRUW RQ Whe SWaWe 
Rf Whe AUW)¶ [2009] The GeRUgeWRZQ LaZ JRXUQal 803, 821. 
169 The so-called µCRlliQgUidge DilePPa¶. Collingridge (n 142). 
170 LeVVig, µThe LaZ Rf Whe HRUVe¶ (Q 37) 533±534. 
171 FRU iQVWaQce, iQ LeVVig¶V e[aPSle, Whe gRYeUQPeQW could regulate the design of cyberspace in ways that facilitated its 
own ability to regulate the internet. 
172 SeaQ WaWWV, µRegXlaWiRQ-Tolerant Weapons, Regulation-ReViVWaQW WeaSRQV aQd Whe LaZ Rf WaU¶ (2015) 91 
International Law Studies 83. 
173 Mette Eilstrup-SaQgiRYaQQi, µWh\ Whe WRUld NeedV aQ IQWeUQaWiRQal C\beUZaU CRQYeQWiRQ¶ (2018) 31 PhilRVRSh\ 
& Technology 379. 
174 EUica D BRUghaUd aQd ShaZQ W LRQeUgaQ, µWh\ AUe TheUe NR C\beU AUPV CRQWURl AgUeePeQWV?¶ (Council on 
Foreign Relations, 16 January 2018) <https://www.cfr.org/blog/why-are-there-no-cyber-arms-control-agreements> 
accessed 22 January 2018; Glennon (n 140). 
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moment),175 or that the existing governance regimes are perceived to be entirely adequate and up to 
the task. Instead, it is either conceptual difficulties of classification, or more saliently the underlying 
political gridlock,176 which prevents the resolution of this visible, technology-precipitated 
problem.177 
Even at a domestic level, legal erosion can occur in a staggered or multi-level process.178 There may 
be cases where the emergence of a new technology (whether GMOs, file-sharing, reproductive 
cloning, for example), or certain high-profile visceral incidents spark public concern and drive rapid 
calls for regulators to impose bans. Regulators may then decide that a full-scale prohibition is 
indeed the appropriate course of action. If the prohibition²or the sanctions invoked to enforce it, or 
the indirect societal consequences of its enforcement²is eventually judged to be deeply unpopular, 
however, and there is widespread non-compliance amongst regulatees, then regulators may find 
themselves forced to redraw regulatory lines in a less strict or constraining way.179 This would then 
kick-start a second phase of regulation, aimed not at full-scale prohibition but rather restricted 
access²with rules crafted in ways that reflect the most pressing concerns. This may eventually 
merge into a third phase of regulation, as restrictions become increasingly watered down, and 
affordances much easier to act on. The law becomes so permissive that it simply reflects and 
endorses prevailing public opinion. In such cases, the relevant legal frameworks are perhaps not 
YiVibl\ µeURded¶; bXW WhaW iV RQl\ becaXVe Whe\ haYe \ielded Whe cRQWeVWed gURXQd, aQd haYe beeQ lefW 
stretched so far as to be almost nominal.180  
Thus, while some affordances created by AI may lend themselves more easily to Legal 
Development in principle, it is plausible that many uses of the technology will also prove highly 
resistant to many of the established tools of regulation. Along with definitional problems around the 
technology, there are also practical ones: Matthew Scherer has argued that AI research and 
deYelRSPeQW SURceVVeV aUe RfWeQ µDiVcUeeW, DiffXVe, DiVcUeWe, aQd OSaTXe¶,181 and that this creates 
practical problems for effective national regulation.182 While these types of Legal Destruction are 
not a categorical threat to regulation, such technologies may leave semi-SeUPaQeQW µhRleV¶ iQ legal 
systems. The continuing dysfunction, contestation, or rapid obsolescence of any early regulatory 
                                                 
175 Although some have argued that the risk of cyberwar is in fact overblown. Thomas Rid, Cyber War Will Not Take 
Place (1 edition, Oxford University Press 2013). 
176 OQ Whe WRSic Rf glRbal gRYeUQaQce µgUidlRck¶ geQeUall\, Vee alVR Thomas Hale and David Held, Beyond Gridlock 
(Polity Press 2017).  
177 One might argue that, if the barrier that is preventing adequate Legal Development is not conceptual, but simply 
political, that this means this is not so much a disruption to law and regulation, and rather more a disruption to broader 
governance. However, while the source of the pURbleP¶V iQWUacWabiliW\ Pa\ be SRliWical, iW effecWV caQ VWill caUU\ RYeU 
onto the legitimacy of the prevailing legal instruments. 
178 We thank Roger Brownsword for suggesting the distinct scenario explored in this paragraph. 
179 One might, indeed, call this the µPURhibiWiRQ-SURbleP¶, iQ PePRU\ Rf Whe ill-fated US regulatory response, during the 
eSRQ\PRXV µProhibition-eUa¶, Zhich aWWePSWed WR UeVWUicW Whe µWechQRlRg\¶ Rf widely available alcohol.  
180 Finally, in this context it is important to clarify that legal erosion does not necessarily need to start form a regulatory 
prohibition or restriction. In principle, it could emerge even from relatively permissive or standard-setting frameworks, 
if these were simply not followed or taken up by (open-source) developers of the technology, or citizens and consumers. 
However, because failed bans create the most extreme and (publicly visible) stresses and failures of the law, they create 
the most legal friction if they are not upheld, and as such create the strongest driver of erosion.  
181 Scherer (n 16) 369. 
182 FRU a diVcXVViRQ Rf µVRfW¶ legal deVWUXcWiRQ Rf cRPSRQeQWV Rf iQWeUQaWiRQal laZ, Vee alVR MaaV, µIQWeUQaWiRQal LaZ 
DReV NRW CRPSXWe¶ (Q 76). 
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initiatives ± and the resulting inability of regulators to adequately address certain pressing societal 
issues through Legal Development ± may come to undercut the perceived efficacy and legitimacy of 
regulators in the eyes of their public. 
ii. Decline 
Finall\, aQd PRUe VSecXlaWiYel\, WheUe iV a µhaUd¶ YeUViRQ Rf Whe Legal DeVWUXcWiRQ aUgXPeQW Zhich, 
while rarer, is more foundationally erosive to law insofar as the affordances introduced by a new 
technology potentially threaten the scaffolding of the rule of (normative) law itself by increasing 
avenues for resistance, evasion or contestation. Just as the early internet¶V RSSRUWXQiWieV for 
anonymous trans-border communication were once (though only for a time) held to be beyond the 
jurisdiction of states, and to enable the organization of social resistance, so new technologies may 
afford different parties either greater ability or willingness to evade or even outright defy the rule of 
laZ. FRU iQVWaQce, VRPe haYe diVcXVVed hRZ cU\SWRgUaSh\¶V SRWeQWial WR UeViVt governmental 
VXUYeillaQce PakeV iW aQ iQheUeQWl\ SRliWical WRRl, RQe WhaW µUeaUUaQgeV SRZeU [aV] iW cRQfigXUeV ZhR 
caQ dR ZhaW, fURP ZhaW´.183 Likewise, the use and proliferation of 3D-printed guns might 
hypothetically challenge (if only in a very limited way) the state monopoly on the use of force. 
Likewise, AI has been anticipated to enable the scaling up of existing categories of crime, as well as 
the introduction of entirely novel categories of misuse.184 For instance, the use of AI in the context 
of DeepFakes and computational propaganda might help various non-state actors further contest the 
epistemic authority of states. Furthermore, the generation of anti-facial UecRgQiWiRQ µadYeUVaUial 
SaWcheV¶ caQ helS VRPe eYade (RU eYeQ VSRRf aQd hijack) aXWRPaWic video surveillance systems in 
the context of Smart City surveillance grids.185 The prospects for such legal destruction are 
uncertain, of course. In many (if not all) areas, new technologies appear to disproportionately aid 
and abet (state) power and surveillance capability,186 and ± as the discussion of Legal Displacement 
indicates ± AI appears no exception here. Nonetheless, insofar as new AI technologies afford more 
parties the possibility to evade, neuter or contest the modalities of regulation, it poses a more 
general challenge to the authority, legitimacy or efficacy of law in general. This is hardly without 
SUecedeQW: iQ LeVVig¶V aQal\ViV, Whe UiVe Rf SUiYaWe-sector code on cyberspace saw the dispersal of 
functional regulatory authority (by architecture) to the private sector, with all that that entailed.187 
Likewise, hard Legal Destruction may connote the dispersal of regulatory authority, in the broad 
sense that certain technologies may yield an increased ability, in a broader range of actors (beyond 
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186 cf. Susskind (n 9). 
187 LeVVig, µThe LaZ Rf Whe HRUVe¶ (Q 37) 533±536. 
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the traditional regulators), to begin to influence, shape and affect the modalities of regulation that 
constrain not just other regulatees, but also the regulators themselves. 
4. A User-Guide to the Legal Disruption Model: Reflections 
We have discussed why a comprehensive model of Legal Disruption would be needed, both in the 
cRQWe[W Rf laZ¶V UelaWiRQ ZiWh QeZ WechQRlRg\ iQ geQeUal, bXW alVR iQ Whe VSecific caVe Rf Whe fXll-
spectrum societal changes that AI technology appears set to unleash. We then discussed in detail 
both Stage I (potential pathways towaUdV a µdiVUXSWiYe PRPeQW¶) aQd Stage II (the regulatory 
responses to a disruptive moment). Before discussing some of the specific benefits and drawbacks 
of the model, it is important to highlight that there are two distinct attitudes or mindsets in which 
the Legal Disruption Model can be deployed. 
In the first, more moderate case, the model can be used descriptively: to assess, chart, and interpret 
past and present legal disruptive moments that were (or are) precipitated by socio-technological 
change, and which were (or are) explicitly recognised as such by a legal system. Under this 
analysis, one could explore the pathway by which a given specific usage of AI technology188 was 
conceived, developed, explored, implemented, and thereby gave rise to certain new affordances 
Zhich ZeUe VXbVeTXeQWl\ aQd cUiWicall\ UecRgQi]ed (µWhe DiVUXSWiYe MRPeQW¶) b\ legal VchRlaUV aQd 
authorities as requiring Legal Development, offering opportunities for Legal Displacement, or 
threatening Legal Destruction. To give but one example, many commentators argue that responses 
to cyberwarfare requires a new global treaty framework having recognised it as a truly global 
problem. This is a clear case of a technologically-driven problem being recognized as exceeding the 
efficacy of existing law. This creates a need for Legal Development. Yet, the cyberwarfare example 
also underscores where political and operational considerations can make progress on such 
necessary Legal Development difficult or even intractable, in this case where the failure of the 
envisioned Legal Development feeds back into a second-stage Disruptive Moment, but this time 
leaning responses towards outcomes within Legal Destruction.  
Using this model descriptively is valuable because it allows one to see the interactions of one 
disruptive moment with another, and the interaction effects between Legal Development, 
Displacement, and Destruction. Implicitly, such usage of the model would take an µiQWeUVXbjecWiYe¶ 
(RU eYeQ SRViWiYiVW) VWaQce RQ Whe TXeVWiRQ Rf ZhaW µPeUiWV¶ WUeaWPeQW aV legal disruption.189 Simply, 
this is whatever a legal system has already proclaimed, or at least conceded, is a problem that 
exceeds the bounds of their (current) response. Such a mindset does not seek to contest perceptions. 
This approach has its merits: it enables one to work productively on problems that are already 
recognized and highlighted in legal scholarship, and does not seek to arbitrate or second-guess legal 
responses to what will and will not constitute a legally challenging technology. It does, however, 
UiVk beiQg a µWhiQ¶ UeadiQg WhaW liPiWV Whe aQal\VeV WR UeWURVSecWiYe RU SUeVeQWl\-identified legal 
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challenges posed by technology. It is, furthermore, a retrospective analysis that precisely reflects the 
weakness of much of the current fragmented legal responses to technology. This is because it is 
only able to reckon with the efficacy or effects of regulatory responses that arose once the societal 
disruption precipitated by a new technology was severe enough that the fact of a disruptive moment 
became self-evident, thereby failing to moderate the turbulence that society experiences in the 
transitional phases.   
IQ cRQWUaVW, a µWhick¶ aSSlicaWiRQ Rf RXU PRdel would take a more predictive stance. Here, one is able 
to examine both the validity of hyperbolic claims that certain technologies create a state of legal 
disruption, or exception that requires radical legal overhaul (or the relinquishment of certain 
values). Conversely, this predictive stance enables the identification and examination ongoing or 
anticipated socio-technological shocks in society which ought to give rise to a disruptive moment, 
even though scholars and regulators are not (yet) treating it as such. Such a normative analysis, of 
course, requires grounding. There are several ways to do so, and we do not take a strong position on 
which is more meaningful, legitimate, or warranted.  
In the first place, one can evaluate (the lack of) an explicit disruptive moment by reference to the 
stated goals of the regulators themselves. We can then interrogate the validity of a disruptive 
moment. For example, do DeepFakes really pose a threat to democracy? Do trolley problems really 
represent a plausible or common failure mode of self-driving cars? Moreover, we can interrogate 
the efficacy of the proffered legal responses. Do these actually correspond to the underlying 
problematic (technological) affordances? For instance, the growing unemployment witnessed in 
many countries might be driven by technologies of automation, but might be framed by certain 
regulators as being driven by migration instead. In such cases, Legal Development emphasizing the 
introduction of new migration bans, or rollbacks on certain individual rights, would simply not 
connect much to the underlying causal factors of automation. In such cases, the legal disruption 
model can highlight the limited efficacy of a response, and reaffirm that if the stated goal of the 
regulator is to address the wave in unemployment, then there is a need for a different legal 
disruptive moment (focused on Legal Development to respond to growing structural unemployment 
as a result of automation). 
In the second place, such a normative analysis might be grounded by appeal to an objective µSUe-
cRPSeWiWiYe¶ cUiWeUia. CRPSaUe, fRU iQVWaQce, RRgeU BURZQVZRUd¶V ZRUk RQ hRZ YaUiRXV XVeV Rf AI 
(in personal recommender systems, killer robots and biased decision making) may be understood to 
affecW Whe fXQdaPeQWal µcRPPRQV cRQdiWiRQV¶ Rf hXPaQ ageQc\ RU hXPaQ life ± the conditions 
necessary to have and express any higher-level value or normative disagreements in the first 
place.190 In such cases, one could argue that certain new technologies are on a plausible trajectory 
that will threaten to exceed the bounds of the existing legal system eventually (for example by 
radically challenging legal concepts; or by offering far-reaching opportunities for wholesale Legal 
Displacement or even contestation and Legal Destruction). The normative argument here would be 
that an early response to what presently appears to be a small threat might be justified lest it 
eventually snowballs into some truly catastrophic threat. Even if the challenges or risks created by 
these technologies are not yet severe enough to warrant treatment as a truly disruptive moment, or 
its severity has not yet been recognized as justifying inclusion within the legal disruption model, its 
                                                 
190 cf. BURZQVZRUd, µFURP EUeZhRQ WR AlShaGR¶ (Q 21). 
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trajectory suggests more cautious treatment. This could perhaps take the form of a series of smaller, 
SUecaXWiRQaU\ VWeSV Rf Legal DeYelRSPeQW iQ RUdeU WR fRUeVWall aQ accXPXlaWiRQ Rf µWeQViRQV¶, Whe 
locking-in of path-dependent decisions, and far more broad, pervasive, and irreversible disruptive 
moments down the road.  
Finally, a normative analysis might simply be grounded in the usual set of first-order political or 
normative principles. This can take place by opening up opportunities tR µUeYeal QeZ UighWV¶,191 or to 
identify and contest areas where certain new affordances emerge which a prevailing legal system 
might perceive as being unproblematic. An example of this might be the ability of AI technology to 
empower scrutiny and surveillance writ large. Indeed such a system might even be complicit in 
implementing such effects, as part of a move towards Legal Displacement, but which could be 
considered problematic from a wide range of normative or political principles. 
These are some basic reflections on how one could approach and implement this model, and what 
implications this has for the types of analysis one can undertake, and the (normative or epistemic) 
precommitments this entails. We do not, however, seek to settle debates over which of these 
mindsets or attitudes is preferable here. Keeping this distinction in mind, we now turn to discuss 
some of the benefits and drawbacks of the model more broadly. 
5. Advantages and Drawbacks of the Proposed Model 
From the perspective of how to approach socio-technologically driven change, a strong advantage 
of the Legal Disruption Model is that law, policy, regulation and governance approaches are placed 
front and centre. In foregrounding the regulatory framework, this relegates the importance of the 
intrinsic characteristics of the technology under discussion. As such, this approach clearly follows 
Balkin and rejects the path taken by Calo. Taking such a stance is important because AI and the 
claims made around its capacities can be extremely distracting for legal scholars and decision-
makers.192 Furthermore, the legal disruption approach is not limited to examining the legal impact 
emanating directly from the properties of AI²for example the questions of liability arising from the 
liminal position that AI occupies between the categories of agent/person and patient/object²but it 
iV alVR caSable Rf WakiQg iQWR accRXQW µVecRQd RUdeU¶ effecWV WhaW iPSacW XSRQ Whe UegXlaWRU\ 
configuration. While Balkin situates such effects primarily in social relationships, legal disruptions 
can also cascade from changes in political, economic or normative-cultural shifts that AI 
applications trigger. The prospect for widespread technological unemployment, for example, might 
constitute an example of this: studying the intrinsic characteristics or capacities of AI from a legal 
perspective does not appear to further legal or policy responses capable of addressing the challenge 
of mass-unemployment. The legal disruption perspective, however, would address the socio-
economic upheaval as regulatory turbulence and engage with the complexity of such a problem.  
Placing law and regulation front and centre through the legal disruption framework also acts as a 
cRXQWeUbalaQce WR cRQceUQV WhaW µWechQRlRgiVWV¶, and their advocates who are positioned to gain 
materially from the development of emerging technologies, dominate in social commentaries and 
ethical discussions in relation to those developments. At the same time, ethicists and jurists can 
                                                 
191 Jack PaUkeU aQd DaYid DaQkV, µHRZ TechQRlRgical AdYaQceV CaQ ReYeal RighWV¶ (2019) <hWWS://ZZZ.aieV-
conference.com/wp-content/papers/main/AIES-19_paper_129.pdf>. 
192 Mandel (n 129). 
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often be overly sceptical of fast-paced technological change or at least keep their distance from 
engaging with such developments which are perceived to be beyond their separate magisteria. Thus, 
the conceptual framing of legal disruption provides an additional benefit: it becomes a clearly legal 
undertaking. This appears trite, but there has been a strong temptation for legal scholars to take on 
the role of technology critics, journalists, and even futurists, as they became distracted by the hype 
around emerging technologies such as AI. The initial µURbRlaZ¶ framing failed to sufficiently 
emphasise the legal dimension, perhaps because it merely juxtaposed the law alongside 
technological developments.  
In the context of the Easterbrook-Lessig debate in cyberlaw, discussed above, the legal disruption 
framework provides a suitably high threshold for the legal consideration of AI and so maximises the 
possibility that something fruitful might be learnt from this consideration about the whole law. This 
is because legal questions that can be accommodated in existing legal doctrine are sufficiently 
routine to trigger relatively reflexive thinking and response processes. The requirement for legal 
disruption, however, defamiliarises and thereby facilitates a re-evaluation of why the law is 
structured in such a way as to have inconsistencies and anomalies when AI is factored into the 
system. In this sense, AI is merely the vehicle which overturns automatic thinking processes in 
response to legal questions by forcing us to articulate justifications for positions that would have 
otherwise been taken for granted and be subject to wide consensus.  
An additional benefit of utilising legal disruption as a conceptual framework is that it orientates 
regulatory attention towards a dynamic target. Whereas Balkin criticised Calo for unnecessarily 
fixing a set of characteristics as being legally-UeleYaQW, BalkiQ¶V ValieQce aSSURach aSSeaUV WR be 
more static than initially evident because it is focused upon the social impact of robotics without 
factoring in the mechanisms that alter this through time. In an important sense, the legal disruption 
framework addresses sociotechnical change, and indeed change more generally, over time because 
it focuses on both the disruptive properties of the technology and how this affects social-normative 
relations.193 The disruptive changes covered by this framework must be both structurally significant 
and trigger turbulence. In these senses, the legal disruption framework establishes additional criteria 
that direct attention at the sources of the challenges introduced by AI. As legal and policy responses 
to challenges posed by artificial intelligences are overcome or otherwise settled, those issues lose 
their disruptive effect and thereby fall out of the ambit of the model. As such, legal disruption 
constantly filters out those questions that no longer offer the alternative vantage point that might 
lead to new understandings of the law.  
Related to this, the legal disruption approach allows us to deploy AI as a critical mirror to the legal 
and regulatory system. This is because AI forces us to reevaluate a great number of social 
constructs and knowledge that were just taken for granted as functional, and requires that we enter 
in an exercise of self-assessment and criticism.194 It offers a rare chance to step outside of 
contemporary legal processes, principles and presumptions, to stress-test their continuing efficacy, 
validity and viability, so as to review and if necessary revise them. From a separate vantage point, it 
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194 ThiV PiUURU PighW RQl\ UeYeal µlaWeQW¶ aPbigXiWieV Zhich haYe SeUViVWed iQ Whe laZ all alRQg, bXW haYe RQl\ becRPe 
perceptible through the prism of AI, for example, CalR, µRRbRWicV aQd Whe LeVVRQV Rf C\beUlaZ¶ (Q 58) 550±553; 
Lawrence Lessig, Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace, Version 2.0 (2nd Revised ed. edition, Basic Books 2006) 25±
26 <http://codev2.cc/download+remix/Lessig-Codev2.pdf>. 
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is also possible to see any flaws or inconsistencies more clearly. It also provides a rare opportunity 
to improve the law, by updating its doctrine to reflect the contemporary scientific paradigm and 
future realities. In other words, by applying the legal disruption framework we can improve the law 
and not just learn more about its dynamics: by examining the ways in which its doctrines might 
breakdown when confronted with AI we are given the chance to make it more resilient against other 
extraneous shocks (for example, the shocks emanating from other emerging technologies such as 
neuroscience and nanotechnology). The lens of legal disruption, then, is really at the core of 
µillXPiQaWiQg Whe eQWiUe laZ¶ fURP a diffeUeQW SeUVSecWiYe, aQd QRW jXVW Whe diVUXSWiYe iPSacts of a 
particular set of technologies. It is a general framework for understanding the process of legal 
disruption that can be applied to specific, technology-induced, disruptions. 
Finally, the legal disruption model offers three main practical benefits. The focal nature of the 
disruptive moment gives rise to three general regulatory responses that both streamlines and 
separates those responses. First, this saves users from having to reinvent the wheel every time legal 
and regulatory questions are raised anew by AI (and by other emerging technologies); but it also 
expands the range of vision for those framing such responses as these need not be mutually 
exclusive, but rather may be nested at different levels of analysis. Second, in setting out the flows 
and feedbacks of possible regulatory responses, the legal disruption framework illuminates the 
types of consequences that might flow from the disruptive moment, the kinds of regulatory 
responses that might be pursued, and the possible consequences of adopting those responses. And 
third, the legal disruption framework identifies subtle yet perilous trajectories that regulatory 
responses might take which are more difficult or even impossible to recover from: such warning 
lights suggest that greater vigilance is necessary under certain conditions that would have been 
overlooked absent this framework. 
Despite its many advantages, the legal disruption framework has its limitations. The legal disruption 
fUaPeZRUk, like LeVVig¶V regulatory modalities, is atemporal. The lack of trajectory constitutes a 
significant shortcoming that limits the legal disruption framework to being merely responsive to 
external developments. While the legal disruption framework identifies categories and sub-
categories for responses to the disruptive moment, the model as it currently stands does not indicate 
the factors of conditions which prejudice certain types of responses over others. Presumably, the 
configuration of the preceding factors and its interaction with the characteristics of the legal and 
regulatory order would suggest that certain categories of responses are more likely or more useful 
than others.  
Questions also arise as to how exactly we identify a disruptive moment. In setting out the 
framework we have commented on what happens to generate a disruptive moment in the abstract 
(i.e. some change ± real, perceived, or anticipated ± in behaviour that puts pressure on the existing 
legal framework), but more detail will be required if we are to identify disruptive moments in real 
time. What are the characteristics that signal or distinguish one? Are there features in the preceding 
factors that prejudice towards certain general category outcomes over others? 
Finally, there are lingering questions about the more advanced dynamics that might support or 
encourage certain forms of legal disruption. How does Legal Development, Legal Displacement, or 
Legal Destruction feedback into social behaviour and generate the potential for future disruptions? 
How do social values change in response to technological change? Would this moderate any 
resulting legal disruption? These unaddressed questions provide plenty of room for future 
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elaboration and refinement of the model. We do not feel, however, that they undermine its utility in 
its current form. 
6. Concluding Thoughts for the Artificial Intelligence and Legal Disruption Model  
In this paper, we have developed a new model to understand the ways in which new technologies 
drive legal disruption in the doctrine, processes, practices, and even viability of legal systems, and 
we clarified this model through an application to the legal disruptions driven by AI systems. In 
section I, we first defended the need for this new conceptual model. In section II, we situated this 
model in relation to preceding debates concerning the interaction of legal systems with new 
technologies, in particular Whe µc\beUlaZ¶ aQd µURbRlaZ¶ debaWeV; aQd to set out a detailed model for 
understanding the legal disruption precipitated by AI, both in terms of the factors and developments 
WhaW feed iQWR a µdiVUXSWiYe PRPeQW¶, aQd iQ WeUPV Rf Whe diffeUeQW W\SeV Rf UeVSRQVeV (DeYelRSPeQW, 
Displacement, or Destruction) that can result, as well as how to use such a model of legal 
disruption. 
The study of artificial intelligence and legal disruption should not be viewed as its own distinct 
legal subject. It is, rather, a vantage point from which we can scrutinise existing legal presumptions, 
principles and processes. This holds the promise of being able to refine and reinvigorate the law, 
rather than just the scramble to fill in the lacunae that are wrenched open or revealed by the 
prospect of artificial intelligence. Engaging critical reflection about the roles and functions that the 
law should fulfil, not merely how lex lata actually functions, encourages responses in more 
expansive terms about the prospects and pitfalls of the regulatory enterprise. By employing the legal 
diVUXSWiRQ fUaPeZRUk Ze caQ aYRid EaVWeUbURRk¶V LaZ Rf Whe HRUVe fallac\, eYeQ if there are certain 
developments which do in fact spawn entirely new legal areas (corporate law and European Union 
law come to mind) which are now not considered contentious.  
As artificial intelligence is often claimed to be an exponential technology,195 and law progresses 
incrementally in a linear fashion, there is bound to be a point at which the exponential take off 
crosses the straight line if these assumptions hold. Everything to the left of this intersection, where 
AI is below the line, is where hype about the technology does not quite live up to expectations and 
is generally disappointing in terms of functioning and capability. To the right of this intersection, 
however, the previously dull technology takes on a surprising and startling tone as it rapidly 
outpaces both predictions about its capacities and collective abilities to contextualise, accommodate 
or situate it. It is widely claimed that we are now nearing this intersection. If these claims hold up, 
the law is one of the institutions that stands to be shocked by the rapid progression and 
incorporation of AI into society. If this is right, then it is important to start projecting forward in an 
attempt to minimise the gap between exponential technologies and linear expectations. The legal 
disruption framework we have presented does exactly this. Furthermore, even if these claims turn 
out to be misguided, thinking though such transformations sheds different light upon the legal 
enterprise which hopes to illuminate the entire law. 
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